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Conventionalization and Reduction in Natural Language Emergence: An Experimental and 
Computational Model Investigation 
 
Russell Richie, Ph D. 
University of Connecticut, 2017 
In the emergence of natural languages, two processes typically co-occur: new form-
meaning mappings are being conventionalized, and these forms reduce, i.e., shorten, in various 
ways. Despite this oft-noted co-occurrence, and the existence of theories of conventionalization 
and reduction separately, there are no explicit, mechanistic, and empirically-motivated theories 
of the connection between the two processes. To fill this gap, the present dissertation aims to 
better understand this relationship both empirically and theoretically, with experimental 
semiotics and agent-based modeling. 
In the experiment, eight groups of four hearing, non-signing English-speaking 
participants were brought into the lab. Quads split into rotating dyads which took turns using 
gestures – usually highly iconic – to communicate (images of) basic objects (e.g., cow, orange, 
boy) to each other. As in naturalistic language emergence, quads conventionalized, reduced, and 
improved success at the task in a self-organizing fashion. Across objects, slope of 
conventionalization negatively correlated with slope of reduction, suggesting that those objects 
that conventionalize more also reduced more. Critically, we found that participants reduced more 
after communication failure, inconsistent with a listener-oriented/rational-agent model of the link 
between conventionalization and reduction, whereby conventionalization causes communication 
success, which causes agents to try reducing their utterances (i.e., to try to save effort when they 
think communication is likely to succeed). 
Russell Richie, PhD – University of Connecticut, 2017 
 
To develop a new theory of the link between conventionalization and reduction, we 
implemented an agent-based model of gesture production, comprehension, and learning. Three 
key properties subserve the model: (1) probabilistic gesture-object mappings initially set to 
model iconicity (which participants in the experiment spontaneously use), (2) language 
production dependent on a notion of informativeness (understanding one’s own utterance), and 
(3) a single learning mechanism in listeners, whereby listeners align their probabilistic 
associations with speaker’s utterances. This model simultaneously conventionalized and reduced, 
and captured other aspects of our experimental setting. 
 Consistent with previous naturalistic and experimental work, our experiment and model 
each show parallel conventionalization and reduction. To our knowledge, our model is the first to 
simultaneously capture these two phenomena, and shows that conventionalization and reduction 
can simultaneously emerge from independently necessary mechanisms of language production, 
comprehension, and learning, rather than from agents rationally selecting optimal lexicons, or 
optimally responding to their interlocutors’ state of understanding. With our work as a starting 
point, future work could further investigate how conventionalization and reduction relate to the 
emergence of phonology and grammaticalization. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The problem of language emergence 
Most scholars considering how an individual could come to know a language presume 
that the individual is being exposed to a full, natural language produced by elder individuals -- in 
other words, the learner is largely recapitulating the language they were exposed to. But where 
did those elders get their language? To avoid infinite regress, we must imagine that, at some 
point, a new language was bootstrapped de novo, presumably when individuals had need to 
coordinate with each other. Better understanding how such de novo language creation could 
result from individual events of human coordination is the goal of this dissertation. 
Psycholinguistic and developmental interest in language emergence 
Before exploring language emergence further, it is worth briefly motivating an interest in 
the phenomenon from developmental and psycholinguistic perspectives. While language 
emergence is a problem of co-creating among groups of individuals, the nature of the 
individual is still critical. That is, language emergence must rely on individuals representing 
individual concepts and propositions to be conveyed, and encoding and decoding these into/from 
words and sentences, all in real time. These processes are, of course, the domain of 
psycholinguistic theorizing. Further, if such individual communicative/coordinative events are to 
lead to a long-lasting, shared language system, then individuals can not ‘reinvent the wheel’ with 
every new coordinative event -- in other words, they must learn from each event and alter their 
future linguistic behavior accordingly. How exactly that happens is naturally of interest to 
developmentalists [for example, see work by, i.a., Senghas, Kita, and Ozyurek (2004) and 
Senghas and Coppola (2001) for investigations of how the nature of the learner impacts language 
emergence]. 
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Narrowing into lexicon emergence  
We now refine our interest within language emergence. There are many aspects of 
language that must be created, from phonetics/phonology up to syntax (and perhaps beyond to 
semantics and pragmatics). In this work, we start with (but will occasionally branch out from) a 
focus on lexicon1 emergence. The lexicon is of particular interest in language emergence, as it is 
arguably the most fundamental but still meaningful and communicative level of language 
organization (cf. phonological units which are meaningless; prosodic affective cues which are 
often considered para-linguistic; or syntactic and semantic phrases which are not fundamental 
but rather composed). In particular, we will investigate two processes occurring in lexicon 
emergence: 
Phenomenon One: Conventionalization 
First, we examine the emergence of conventional (i.e., shared across a population) form-
meaning mappings. We will consider a form-meaning mapping ‘conventional’ if (1) it is shared 
across a population, and (2) equally good alternatives exist (one can say ‘dog’ or ‘hund’) and the 
choice among these is in some sense ‘arbitrary’2. This is naturally a critical problem in language 
emergence as knowledge of conventions is usually thought to be how one understands my 
utterance of ‘dog’ or ‘hund’ to refer to a kind of four-legged, furry animal (Hockett, 1960). How 
                                                        
1 Here we use lexicon to mean an inventory of form-meaning associations, and do not intend to invoke all 
the complexity that a mature language’s lexicon might have. For example, we do not presume that the 
form-meaning associations we study are ‘words’, or have syntactic features like grammatical category. It 
may be best to think of our object of study as merely ‘referring expressions’. 
2 There is much debate about what makes a behavior conventional, e.g., whether conventions require 
common knowledge (this is a technical sense of ‘common knowledge’ attributed to philosopher David 
Lewis’s (1969) Convention; roughly, p is common knowledge if and only if everyone knows p, everyone 
knows that everyone knows p, everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows that p, etc.). I 
will not assume common knowledge, and will, for the most part, be abstracting away from other 
philosophical debates about conventions (e.g., (1) whether a formerly popular convention that is no longer 
followed, like sending thank you notes, still constitutes a convention, and (2) whether users must know 
that alternative conventions [like ‘perro’ and ‘hund’] exist). At the same time, I leave open the possibility 
that this dissertation and later work based on it could relate to issues of philosophical concern. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on conventions (Rescorla, 2015) is an excellent, accessible 
introduction to such a philosophical treatment of conventions. 
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do such conventional lexicons arise, and how do individual events of language use and learning 
shape lexicon emergence? One can imagine that, in the beginning of language emergence, 
different people could communicate a single meaning (say, ‘cow’) using different forms. One 
person could make a gesture iconically showing MILKING and another could make a gesture 
indicating HORNS. At this point, iconicity, not convention, would be the basis of successful 
communication. However, this iconicity can bootstrap conventionalization; because interlocutors 
can understand each other’s references to some degree, they have a way to bootstrap their 
development of a precise form-meaning map. Thus, when person A utters MILKING, person B 
understands A means ‘cow’ (when ‘cow’ is plausible and other possible meanings associated 
with MILKING, like ‘I want milk’, are not)3. Further, even if B typically uses HORNS, B can 
update their lexical entry for ‘cow’ to MILKING, thus achieving conventionalization between 
this pair. The present experimental and modeling work in this dissertation will rely on iconicity 
to bootstrap conventionalization and language emergence in this way.4 
Phenomenon Two: Reduction 
The second process that we investigate is less obvious a priori, but likely important 
nonetheless. This is the process of reduction, whereby the forms of linguistic elements – from 
phrases down to morphemes -- are either eroded, in terms of properties like form duration or 
reach of intended articulatory targets, or entirely eliminated, leading to fewer discrete elements 
like phonemes or morphemes in a linguistic unit. This is an often-noticed phenomenon in both 
                                                        
3 We are abstracting away from a very important problem often noted in word learning in ontogeny, but 
which also plausibly affects language emergence: the gavagai problem (Quine, 1960). That is, an 
utterance of MILKING could plausibly mean ‘cow’, ‘let’s get some milk’, ‘this is what we do with the 
animal under discussion’, and infinitely many more meanings. 
4 Of course, it is a debate the extent to which different communication mediums afford iconicity, and thus 
the extent to which iconicity could bootstrap language emergence and conventionalization in different 
mediums. The gestural-visual modality seems to afford more iconicity than the vocal-auditory modality. 
We will return to this issue in the discussion. 
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naturalistic and experimental investigations of language emergence and change. To give a few 
examples, (1) for most English words starting with ‘kn’, like ‘knight’, ‘knock’, or ‘knob’, we 
speakers of Modern English do not pronounce aloud the ‘k’, but speakers of Old English did – 
the ‘k’ has since been entirely reduced, (2) the contemporary monomorphemic, monosyllabic 
American Sign Language sign for ‘tomato’ condensed from an historically early compound of 
the signs for ‘red’ and ‘slice’ (Frishberg, 1975), and (3) present day colloquial ‘gonna’ (e.g., 
“I’m gonna walk the dog”) is derived from ‘going to’ (Perez, 1990). Even in a short 
communicative setting (e.g., a radio show; Fowler and Housum, 1987), subsequent uses of a 
form get reduced. For a comprehensive review of reduction, see Jaeger and Buz (2016). This set 
of examples, then, illustrates that reduction is a robust phenomenon, affecting both 
morphological and phonological/phonetic units, over short and long timescales, in early and late 
stages of language evolution, and in multiple language modalities (sign and speech). One further 
important quality of the phenomenon of reduction is especially worth commenting on: the 
linguistic variables affected by reduction can be either continuous [e.g., the duration of the schwa 
vowel (the ‘o’) in ‘memory’] or discrete (e.g., the number of syllables in ‘memory’, which could 
be 2 or 3, depending on whether one completely eliminates the ‘o’). Continuity vs. discreteness 
is an important distinction that we’ll make throughout the present work so that we don’t conflate 
different phenomena and theories of those phenomena, but it is not going to be a primary focus 
of this work, and so we will not say too much new about it. We only mention it so the reader has 
a clear idea of our interest: we will be focusing on cases of morpheme elimination (a case of 
discrete reduction). 
We see similar reduction phenomena even early in language emergence, like those found 
by Meir et al. (2010), which deserve special attention here. They investigated the emergence of 
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compounds (in English, this includes things like “dog house”) in the emerging Al-Sayyid 
Bedouin Sign Language in the Negev Desert of Israel. They found that as compounds became 
conventionalized in the community, they also became more reduced. In particular, they observed 
that in less conventionalized compounds in ABSL, signers tended to use multiple signs (on the 
order of two to five) in sequence to describe an object. For more conventionalized compounds, 
however, such sequences were reduced to two or three signs. Similarly, older signers often used 
compounds where younger signers produced a single sign. For example, in one group of signers, 
the older cohort produced a compound MOVIE^WIDE-OBJECT to describe a ‘TV set’, whereas 
the younger cohort in that group only signed MOVIE. In another group, the two older signers 
produced compounds for ‘closet’ (CLOTHES^DOORS) and for ‘dove’ (PECK^WINGS), while 
their three daughters produced just DOORS and WINGS. Once again, note that this reduction is 
discrete, concerning count (0, 1, 2, 3, etc.) of what are essentially morphemes. Osugi, Supalla, 
and Webb (1999) likewise found that, for a homesign-using family on Amami Island off the 
coast of Japan, the conventionalization of a compound for the concept ‘year’ occurred as a four-
gesture compound evolved into a two-gesture compound. The same phenomenon arises in 
Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL). Multiple Nicaraguan homesigning families, who are thought 
to approximate the pre-NSL state, use unconventional multimorphemic expressions for objects 
that the Nicaraguan Sign Language community describes with highly conventionalized, 
monomorphemic expressions (Richie, Yang, Coppola, 2014; Richie, unpublished data). It is this 
co-occurrence between conventionalization and reduction in naturalistic cases of language 
emergence that is the central phenomenon of interest in this dissertation. 
Co-occurrence between conventionalization and reduction can also be observed in 
experimental work. In one study in a now classic line of work, Schober and Clark (1989) had 
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pairs of participants tell each other, in English, how to arrange 12 complex figures (“Tangrams”). 
They found that, as participants came to agree on referring expressions for individual figures and 
became more accurate at the task, their referring expressions got shorter (a case of morpheme 
reduction, rather than phonetic/phonological reduction; notice, too, that this reduction is discrete 
rather than continuous). For example, one tangram was initially described as “like a, a dancer or 
something really weird. Um, and, has a square head”. At the end of the experiment, the same 
tangram was described as “the dancer with the big fat leg”, an utterance half as long as the initial. 
More recently, Caldwell and Smith (2012) asked groups of participants to describe colors to each 
other purely through drawing, and found that, as success and conventionality in groups 
improved, the drawings became simpler and more reduced. Similarly, Namboodiripad, Lenzen, 
Lepic and Verhoef (2016) asked hearing non-signing participants to play silent, gesture 
‘charade’-like games, and observed not only conventionalization,5 but also reduction in the size 
of the articulatory space and in the distance traveled by the articulators in that space (continuous 
variables). 
Broader implications of conventionalization and reduction 
Before exploring how and why conventionalization and reduction happen the way they 
do (and particularly why they co-occur), we consider additional reasons why conventionalization 
and reduction are of broader theoretical interest. 
Linguists, recognizing Hockett (1960)’s Duality of Patterning, often divide language into 
two broad domains of structure: the P-side, which concerns phonological, prosodic, and phonetic 
properties of language, and the S-side, which concerns syntactic and semantic (and usually 
pragmatic) properties of language. To simplify quite a bit, the P-side concerns the medium of 
                                                        
5 Namboodiripad et al.’s (2016) analyses actually measure communication success, but they informally 
report conventionalization as correlating with reduction. 
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language (speech, sign, writing, etc.), and the S-side concerns meaning. Each side has a very 
elaborate computational nature that is expressively powerful (see Heinz and Idsardi, 2013 for a 
comparison of the computational complexity of S-side structures and P-side structures in terms 
of the Chomsky Hierarchy) and also particularly efficient for communication (for example, see 
Nowak & Krakauer, 1999 for arguments that phonology is an efficient solution to the problem of 
noisy communication). These are thus clearly important properties of our language system, and 
their emergence begs for explanation. We will make the case now that conventionalization and 
reduction may play a role in the development of both S-side complexity and P-side complexity. 
First, concerning the P-side, conventionalization and reduction may play a role in the 
emergence of phonological combinatoriality, the property of language where morphemes are 
composed of discrete, meaningless elements. For example, Sandler, Aronoff, Meir, and Padden 
(2011), using data from the emerging Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL), make the 
following argument. They propose that, early in language emergence, iconicity is the basis of 
communication and thus controls language form. Only when conventionalization takes root and 
shared convention forms the basis of communication are forms freed from the requirements of 
iconicity (and attention to the iconic form-meaning mapping is reduced). They are then allowed 
to reorganize (under pressures for, e.g., formal symmetry and ease of articulation) into a 
phonological system with a limited inventory of meaningless (here, manual) elements that 
combine in constrained ways (see Brentari, 2007, 2017 for discussion of sign language 
phonology). For example, a gesture for ‘tree’ may initially iconically represent a tree, with the 
arm representing the trunk and the hand the canopy. Over time, users may recognize the gesture 
as conventionally referring to ‘tree’, completely short-circuiting the role of iconicity, and 
allowing the form to change in ways that erode its iconicity while also bringing the form into 
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closer relation with other signs/gestures (perhaps the hand-shape in the tree gesture becomes 
more aligned with phonetically similar hand-shapes in other signs, leading to a more proper 
discrete phonemic inventory). Consistent with this, Roberts, Lewandowski, and Galantucci 
(2015) and Verhoef, Kirby, and de Boer (2015), which both manipulated the availability of 
iconic form-meaning mappings to participants, provide experimental evidence that iconicity 
impedes phonological combinatoriality in emerging communication systems. Reduction -- also 
often due to redundancy of form, as redundant elements can be eliminated without reducing a 
form’s identifiability -- similarly erodes iconicity, as parts of a form that contribute to iconicity 
are reduced or eliminated entirely, again enabling the transition to phonological systematicity. 
For example, returning to the ‘tree’ example from above, reductive forces may eliminate, say, a 
hand-shaking movement that iconically resembles a tree’s leaves blowing in the wind, further 
freeing the gesture from iconicity and allowing it to undergo the phonologizing changes 
described above. Thus, an accurate empirical and mechanistic picture of conventionalization and 
reduction may be necessary to understand how phonological combinatoriality emerges. 
Second, conventionalization might also be involved in an important S-side process: 
grammaticalization, or the process by which lexical elements (like nouns and verbs) become 
grammatical ones (like tense or conditional markers) over historical time. Grammaticalization is 
particularly important and of very general interest – for not only language emergence specialists 
but also language scholars of all stripes – as it is an often-invoked explanation for how languages 
acquire their abstract, flexible expressive power. For example, ‘will’ can now be used as an 
auxiliary, grammatical marker of futurity, whereas in Old English the ancestral form ‘willan’ 
was a main verb meaning ‘to want/wish’. It has been argued that a form’s grammaticalization is 
driven by its frequency (Bybee, 2003; 2006). Thus, once a form is conventional, it will increase 
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in frequency, and thus grammaticalized, conventionalization may cause grammaticalization and 
concomitant grammatical sophistication in emerging and changing languages. It may also be that 
more sophisticated, grammaticalized structures can only emerge after more basic ones have been 
conventionalized in a population. Such a pattern appears to obtain in Nicaraguan Sign Language. 
Kocab, Pyers, and Senghas (2015) found that while First- and Second-Cohort NSL users utilize 
the left-right axis of signing space to refer to objects in physical space, only the Second Cohort 
used the left-right axis of signing space to represent changes in perspective on an event (e.g., the 
narrator’s perspective vs. a participant’s perspective). From this, the authors suggest that devices 
using signing space to indicate changes in perspective emerged only after NSL established more 
basic conventions for left-right spatial contrasts in descriptions of physical space. 
Thus, to reiterate, to understand phenomena of more general interest, like 
grammaticalization, phonological combinatoriality, all key properties of both 
syntax/semantics/pragmatics and phonology/phonetics, we may need to first understand 
conventionalization and reduction. 
Theories of conventionalization and reduction 
The above discussion should make clear that conventionalization and reduction are 
(1) important phenomena that occur in language emergence, and (2) occur together. However, it 
is not clear how each phenomenon occurs, and even less clear what causal network(s) might be 
connecting them (i.e., whether one influences the other, they influence each other, and/or 
additional variable(s) affect both). We thus now turn our attention to considering theories of 
conventionalization and reduction, and theories of why they are related. 
One possible theory of language emergence is that strong, central institutions dictate to its 
members how the language should emerge -- in our case, how words should be produced. But a 
role of social institutions, while plausible in the invention and enforcement of some conventions 
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and norms (for example, laws enacted by legislative bodies like the US Congress, or linguistic 
norms recommended by the French Academy), is not particularly plausible for truly de novo 
language emergence. Theories relying on the role of institutions do not explain whether, or how, 
it is possible for conventions to emerge when social institutions are not already in place to guide 
the process, as is commonplace in situations of language emergence (where the institutions only 
emerge after the users of the language have a means -- their language -- to organize). 
Alternatively, language emergence -- and particularly conventionalization and reduction -
- could be the emergent result of many, local interactions between individual language 
users attempting coordination. In other words, language may self-organize. In fact, this is the 
approach most scholars of language emergence take (Bybee, 2006; Galantucci, Garrod, & 
Roberts, 2012; Richie et al., 2014; Baronchelli, Gong, Puglisi, & Loreto, 2010; Sandler et al. 
2011; i.a.). 
Consider conventionalization. Most scholars posit that, even if a population does not 
share a form for a meaning initially, pairs or groups of individuals can interact and gradually 
adjust their future behavior based on such interactions, and thus gradually come to agree on a 
single form for a particular meaning. Beyond this, however, there is not much agreement about 
how conventionalization proceeds. There is recognition that conventionalization is influenced by 
social network structure, but even different experiments and modeling simulations all concerning 
lexical conventionalization find inconsistent effects (e.g., see Gong et al., 2012; Richie et al., 
2014; Centola & Baronchelli, 2015; Hall et al., 2016 for examples). The lack of theoretical 
consensus on conventionalization is likely due to the proliferation of various experimental 
conditions and models. To illustrate, conventionalization in the experiment of Hall et al. (2016) 
and model of Richie et al. (2014) occurred over sequences of gestures, but over single, holistic 
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names in the models of Centola and Baronchelli (2015) and Gong et al. (2012). 
One way to counteract such model proliferation is to strip the models down to a bare 
framework, and then add in features until required components of an effective communication 
system (e.g., conventionality) emerge. Indeed, this is the approach taken by Spike, Stadler, 
Kirby, and Smith (2016), who found that emergence of conventional, unambiguous lexicons 
required (1) transmission of referential information from speaker to hearer (that is, the hearer 
must have some information besides the utterance of what the speaker is referring to; for 
example: a speaker might point to an intended object; or perhaps only a subset of possible 
referents exists in the context of the utterance) (2) an anti-ambiguity bias (e.g., regularly 
removing homonyms from the lexicon), and (3) some form of limitation in the population’s 
memory of past form-meaning pairings. However, as they point out, even within these 
constraints there are a great many possible model architectures that create effective lexicons, and 
different empirical settings could even engage different cognitive mechanisms. Thus, to further 
narrow down the field of models, we need to conduct detailed comparisons between model 
behavior and empirical data. To date, however, investigation of conventionalization (and 
language emergence generally, even) has typically not used computational models to account for 
qualitative (except in the grossest sense: does the model produce agreement in the end or not?) or 
quantitative patterns in empirical conventionalization, Richie et al. (2014) and Centola & 
Baronchelli (2015) being exceptions. In other words, computational models of 
conventionalization often go untested by empirical data. This is one gap to be addressed in this 
dissertation. 
Consensus is also lacking among theories of reduction. A common factor among most or 
all theories of reduction is that frequent or otherwise predictable forms are those that usually 
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become reduced, but theories differ in why frequency or predictability have the reductive effects 
that they do. Listener-oriented theories (also known as common ground or audience design 
theories; Fowler and Housum, 1987; Galati & Brennan, 2010; Arnold, Kahn, & Pancani, 2012; 
Kahn and Arnold, 2012) claim that speakers lengthen or shorten utterances when they expect 
comprehension will be hard or easy, respectively, for the listener. Frequent words and words 
already in the common ground of an interaction are easy for the listener to predict/retrieve, and 
hence can be shortened by the speaker, saving their own time and effort, without sacrificing the 
listener’s comprehension. Such accounts also predict that speakers will augment or reduce their 
utterances based on past success or failure in communicating with interlocutors, i.e., reduce 
utterances after success, and enhance them after failure, a prediction borne out empirically (at 
least with enhancement following failure, e.g., Buz, Tanenhaus, & Jaeger, 2016; Schertz, 2013; 
Stent, Huffman, & Brennan, 2008). Speaker-oriented accounts, by contrast, posit that reduction 
is simply due to facilitated (or primed) production that results from a word being produced 
frequently (e.g., Lam & Watson, 2014; Jacobs et al., 2015). Facilitated, primed, or practiced 
processes, whether they be making a sandwich or singing the ABC’s, are able to be executed 
more quickly, and hence be reduced in duration or length. 
At least two gaps emerge from reviewing this literature on reduction. First, theorists of 
reduction usually concede that these two families of theories are not mutually exclusive, but it 
still remains largely unknown which mechanism(s) cause(s) which of the many empirical cases 
of reduction, the cases of current interest being morphological reduction in language emergence 
settings. In particular, theorists of reduction like Jaeger and Buz (2016, pg. 17) find it “counter-
intuitive to argue that the omission of optional elements (e.g., optional arguments, adjuncts, 
function words) is a consequence of these elements being easy to produce”. Second, work on 
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reduction has mostly been empirical and has been used to construct verbal, often vague, models -
- there are not, to this writer’s knowledge, any computational models of reduction6. Thus, to 
address these gaps, we will attempt to develop a computational model of reduction in number of 
discrete elements. Further, the model we develop may not clearly map onto either speaker- or 
listener-oriented accounts.  
Theories of the relationship between conventionalization and reduction 
Scholars have thus elaborated a number of theories of conventionalization and reduction 
independently. As pointed out in an earlier section, these two phenomena often co-occur in 
language emergence, but this correlation has received even less theoretical development. A 
number of possibilities have been suggested. A common one is that conventionalization leads to 
forms being produced frequently, which, as pointed out above, is in turn a cause of reduction 
(whether through automation/practice for the speaker or ease of retrieval for the listener). Bybee 
(1999, pg 223), for one, suggests that “[w]ords and phrases that are used more 
undergo...reduction as part of the move to automate speech: boundaries are obscured and 
segments and syllables may disappear into the mass of co-articulated gestures”. She thus seems 
to favor a speaker-internal account, but gets no more specific about the particular mechanisms 
involved. Namboodiripad et al. (2016, pg. 8) similarly very briefly suggest that reduction 
correlated with conventionalization results from “routinization of familiar articulatory targets” 
(which, again, are familiar because they are conventionalized). 
There thus seems to be a tendency among language emergence specialists to think that 
conventionalization and reduction interact in the following way: conventionalization causes 
                                                        
6 The closest to a computational model of reduction would be work like Pierrehumbert (2001)’s model on 
lenition (roughly, weakening) of consonants, as in the change of Latin ‘pater’ to English ‘father’ (/p/ and 
/t/ weaken to /f/ and /th/, respectively). Lenition is often understood as a result of articulatory effort 
reduction. But this does not pertain to the reduction in count of discrete elements occurring over time, 
which we are concerned with here. 
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frequent usage of particular forms, which causes facilitated/automated access of such forms in 
the speaker, which results in reduction. However, these suggestions have been somewhat vague 
(again, partly owing to them being purely verbal theories/models), and similarly, as noted at the 
end of the last section, it is not clear that this theory could account for morphological reduction 
(as opposed to phonetic reduction). Further, there are other possible ways in which these two 
processes could interact. For one, it is entirely possible that listener-oriented reduction processes 
mediate the observed correlation between conventionalization and reduction in lexicon 
emergence: conventionalization makes particular forms frequent, i.e. predictable and easily 
accessible by the listener, which allows the speaker to reduce them. A somewhat different 
listener-oriented link might rely on the findings mentioned in the last section that speakers 
modulate their utterances based on the perceived past success or failure of communication. That 
is, language users conventionalize, and then communicate more successfully in virtue of 
conventions, and then reduce more because of communication success. This dissertation will pay 
special heed to investigating this theory experimentally. 
A final possibility – neither speaker- nor listener-oriented – is that conventionalization 
and reduction both emerge – or self-organize – as side-effects resulting from independently 
necessary components of language functions, like production, comprehension, and learning. In 
this theory, no agent is explicitly attempting to either (a) conventionalize with all other agents – 
just their interlocutor, or (b) adjust their lexicon to save effort in communication. Nor would 
automating production have a role in this theory. Such a theory possibly has intuitive appeal for 
its simplicity – it posits no structure beyond what is already necessary for communication and 
learning – but it is presently unclear in its precise operation. The computational model of the 
present dissertation will clarify this theory. 
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The foregoing discussion should make clear that there is still great uncertainty in how 
conventionalization and reduction proceed on their own, and even greater uncertainty regarding 
how they interact. Many a priori plausible theories exist. Part of the uncertainty stems from the 
fact that scholars usually don't look at conventionalization and reduction over time, but rather 
only at the beginning and end. This has made it difficult to examine the ways in which 
conventionalization and reduction influence each other. Therefore, it is important to investigate 
these two phenomena simultaneously in an empirical, longitudinal setting of lexicon emergence, 
and then use a computational model to understand what processes of language use and change 
could give rise to the empirical observations of conventionalization, reduction, and their 
relationship. This is the aim of the present dissertation. In particular, the empirical and modeling 
portions of this dissertation will evaluate the listener-oriented link discussed above – that 
communication success mediates the correlation between conventionalization and reduction – 
and develop the above-described alternative, self-organization-based theory and computational 
model of conventionalization and reduction. 
Chapter 2 - Experimental Method 
 
 We now turn to describing the experiment we carried out to investigate emergence of 
communication systems generally, and conventionalization and reduction specifically. The 
experiment we conduct falls into the field now known as Experimental Semiotics (Galantucci, 
Garrod, and Roberts, 2012), which is concerned with studying emergence of novel human 
communication systems in experimental settings. Such studies have been conducted in a variety 
of communication media – from gestures (Namboodiripad et al., 2016), to slide whistles 
(Verhoef et al., 2015), to drawing pads (Galantucci, 2005) – and have yielded systems possessing 
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many structures found in natural languages, like semantic compositionality (Kirby et al., 2008) 
and phonological combinatoriality (Verhoef, 2012; Verhoef et al., 2015). These studies have 
varied greatly in the ecological naturalism of their experimental design. Galantucci (2005) used a 
drawing pad because it was a novel medium which prevented the use of conventional symbols 
like letters and numbers. This enabled them to investigate communication system emergence 
independent of modality effects of speech or gesture. However, to the extent that most – possibly 
all – naturally emerging/emerged languages are spoken or signed, the modality effects of these 
mediums are of inherent interest to understanding how natural languages emerged. On the other 
hand, Namboodiripad et al. (2016) possessed a degree of ecological validity because it used 
gestures as its communication medium, but lacked in ecological validity because gestural 
systems only developed within pairs, while natural languages develop in groups of many people. 
For the present work, we attempt to capture a relatively high degree of ecological validity 
relative to other experimental semiotics tasks. In brief, our experimental method entails having 
groups of hearing, nonsigning adults play repeated games of “charades”, with the goal of these 
groups gradually developing shared – and reduced – referring expressions for the different 
objects in the task. 
Participants 
We asked hearing undergraduates who had no experience with sign language to engage in 
a dyadic gestural communication task, in groups of four participants each, called “quads”. To 
complete the task, each quad needed to complete two sessions about one week apart. (This time 
delay was due to the logistical constraints of scheduling 4 participants and 2 experimenters, and 
does not play a substantive role in analyses.) Because partial data could not address the research 
questions, it was necessary to discard entire quads if the data were incomplete. This occurred due 
to one or more participants in a quad not showing up for or not completing one of the two 
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sessions (n=6 quads), experimenter or equipment error (n=1 quad), or having had previous 
experience with sign language or gesture, including having previously participated in similar 
gesture experiments (n=1 quad). In order to achieve a final dataset of 16 quads (64 individuals), 
it was necessary to enroll a total of 24 quads (96 individuals). The present data are composed of 
only 8 quads, which interacted in a fully-connected network, wherein each individual has 
opportunities to interact with every other individual (the other 8 quads interacted in a star 
network structure, in which only one participant interacts with the other three members of a 
quad, for a different study). All participants signed informed consent for the study, which was 
approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Connecticut. Participants 
received either course credit or $10/session. Initially participants were paid a $5 bonus for 
completing both sessions; this bonus was later removed when it became clear that it was neither 
necessary nor effective. 
 
Design & Procedure 
Each participant was randomly assigned to a position within the quad, which we refer to 
as A, B, C, and D. Participants then paired off into rotating dyads as shown in Table 1. 
Participants took turns producing and comprehending gestured descriptions of 25 entities. 
Speech, writing, mouthing words, and audible sound effects were prohibited (although 
participants were allowed to silently mouth sound effects like MOO, as we found this was 
common in Nicaraguan homesign, Richie et al., 2014). Each participant had a booklet displaying 
a target image to describe, as well as an array of 25 images corresponding to the possible items 
that their interlocutor might describe. The 25 images were the same for both partners, but 
ordered differently. A low visual barrier prevented participants from looking at each other’s 
booklets and arrays. Figure 1 shows the experimental setup. 
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After one participant described an item using gestures, the other participant would select 
the corresponding image from their own 5 x 5 array by silently pointing to one of the items. The 
experimenter recorded the selected item, and then said “ok” to indicate that the next trial could 
begin. Neither participant received any explicit, reliable feedback from the experimenter about 
the comprehender’s accuracy, but participants were free to signal uncertainty to each other using 
gestures. After the members of a dyad had described all 25 images to each other, they switched 
partners. The first “round” was completed once each participant had communicated with all 
assigned interlocutors. Participants completed rounds 1 and 2 during the first session, and 
completed rounds 3 and 4 approximately one week later, for a total of four interactions with the 
same three interlocutors. 
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Figure 1. Experimental setup. One participant, the describer, sees their current target object on the booklet 
immediately in front of them. They utter a string of gestures to the comprehender across the table, who then selects 
an object from the array. Participants’ arrays have the same objects ordered differently. 
 
Day Round 
Total number of 
pairings so far (i.e., 
# of prior 
interactions among 
A, B, C, & D) 
Room 1 Room 2 
1 
1 
0 AB CD 
2 AC BD 
4 AD BC 
2 
6 AB CD 
8 AC BD 
10 AD BC 
2 
3 
12 AB CD 
14 AC BD 
16 AD BC 
4 
18 AB CD 
20 AC BD 
22 AD BC 
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Table 1. Schedule of interactions. 
Materials 
The stimuli were images of 25 items adapted from Richie and Yang (2013), listed in the 
Appendix. To encourage participants to create expressions that referred to types (e.g., “girl”) 
rather than tokens (e.g., a particular girl), each item was represented by 3 exemplars. The original 
Richie and Yang items were created to be recognizable to Nicaraguan participants; we selected a 
subset of those items that would also be familiar to American college students, and supplemented 
as necessary to ensure that all items had at least one semantically-similar competitor (e.g., ‘cow’ 
had the competitor ‘goat’). 
Coding 
Participants all gave consent to be video-recorded as part of the study. These recordings 
were used for offline coding by the experimenters. For each of the 9600 gestured utterances 
obtained, an experimenter labeled each gesture according to the aspect of the target object that 
the gesture iconically represented. We will refer to these labels as ‘conceptual components’, or 
CC’s. This labeling was applied to all gestures that were produced between trial onset and when 
the interlocutor (correctly or incorrectly) selected an image from the target array. For example, if 
two participants produced a gesture for stroking a beard, but the handshape or motion is slightly 
different, we still code it as BEARD. The motivations for this coding scheme, which focuses on 
conceptual/iconic aspects of a gesture rather than fine phonetic/phonological aspects, were both 
practical and theoretical. Practical motivations included the fact that it was easier to code 
conceptual/iconic aspects rather than phonetic/phonological aspects. This scheme was also 
theoretically motivated because no reliable, corrective feedback was given to participants, and 
yet they communicated successfully, meaning that participants had to rely on iconicity to 
communicate, at least initially. 
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To gauge inter-rater reliability, a second experimenter independently coded 25% of the 
utterances. To measure inter-rater reliability, we chose Cohen’s Kappa. It is thought to be a more 
robust measure of inter-rater reliability than simple percentage agreement, as Cohen’s Kappa 
takes into account the amount of agreement expected due to chance alone. Cohen’s Kappa is 
defined as: 
 
where p0 is the percentage of agreement among raters, and pe is the percentage of agreement 
expected due to chance alone (computed from the observed frequencies of the labels). We 
computed Cohen’s kappa for each combination of item and quad (e.g., the first full network’s 
‘avocado’ utterances). For the broader dataset (the fully-connected networks analyzed here plus 
star networks) from which the present data were drawn, average Cohen’s kappa was .59, 
indicating moderate, bordering on substantial, agreement, according to Landis and Koch’s (1977) 
guidelines. 
Measuring string similarity 
After coding, each gestured utterance was now represented by a set of conceptual 
components (e.g. MILKING, HORNS, DRINK, MOO, 4-LEGS, etc.). We quantify 
conventionalization within a quad with the Jaccard index, a measure of similarity among sample 
sets, defined as the size of the intersection of the sets divided by the size of the union of the sets. 
For example, the sets {HORNS, CHEWING, BEARD}, {HORNS, EARS, BEARD}, {HORNS, 
EARS}, and {HORNS, CHEWING} have a Jaccard index of 1/4 (0.25), because their 
intersection contains 1 element {HORNS} and their union contains 4 elements {HORNS, 
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CHEWING, BEARD, EARS}. Thus, a Jaccard index of 0 reflects total absence of 
conventionalization, while 1 reflects perfect conventionalization. We chose this measure for 
three reasons. First, it computes similarity simultaneously among more than 2 sets. This was 
important as we wanted to compute similarity among four participants simultaneously. Second, it 
is defined over sets of varying length; this was important as participants’ utterances varied in 
length. Third, it is insensitive to order; this was important because participants varied the order 
of their gestures, even when using the same gestures. 
Chapter 3 - Experimental Results 
This section is organized as follows: We first report qualitative impressions of the data 
(Tables 2a and 2b) that illustrate apparent similarity between our experimental data and 
naturalistic data from emerging sign systems like ABSL (Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language). 
We then describe a set of exploratory analyses suggesting that participants conventionalize 
somewhat arbitrary systems (Hockett, 1960; Rescorla, 2015; figures 3 and 4), in a self-
organizing (as opposed to dictatorial) manner (figure 5). We then report analyses showing that 
conventionalization and reduction are correlated across the entire dataset (figure 6), and for 
individual items (figures 7 and 8). Finally, we report two analyses testing a listener-
oriented/communicative account of the link between conventionalization and reduction. In brief, 
these analyses find that participants reduce at higher rates after communication failure, a result 
that is inconsistent with the listener-oriented theory. 
Experimental data have ecological validity 
Tables 2a and 2b show utterances drawn from our experiment, and from signers of ABSL 
(Meir et al. 2010), respectively. Though Tables 2a and 2b show responses for different objects 
(we didn’t include ‘stove’ in our experiment), they show that in both the experimental and 
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naturalistic data, signers and gesturers typically produce multiple iconic forms for each utterance, 
often encoding similar information (e.g., objects’ size and shape, their typical affordances, their 
typical actions). In addition, Morford and Kegl (2000) and Richie, Coppola, and Yang (2014) 
report similar utterances encoding objects’ size, shape, affordances, and actions, for other basic 
objects in both Nicaraguan homesign systems and Nicaraguan Sign Language. The same appears 
to be true for homesign systems on Amami Island near Japan (Osugi, Supalla, & Webb, 1999). 
The apparent similarity between our experimental data and naturalistic data from a variety of 
cultures and types of systems (e.g., homesign, emerging sign languages) suggest a degree of 
ecological validity for our experimental data (in contrast, possibly, to the communication 
mediums of other experimental semiotics tasks, e.g., Galantucci, 2005). 
 
Gesture_1 Gesture_2 Gesture_3 Gesture_4 Gesture_5 Gesture_6 
small-round eat sour wedge small-round peel 
pick small-round eat    
small-round peel 7not-large-round    
not-large-round small-round eat    
Table 2a. Sample of utterances for ‘lime’ produced by a participant in our experiment. Each row 
is a single utterance. 
 
Sign_1 Sign_2 Sign_3 Sign_4 Sign_5 
Turn cook wide-object   
                                                        
7 The gesture for ‘not’ – variously a headshake and/or arms crossed and then uncrossed repeated – is 
likely derived from conventional gestures among American English speakers meaning similar things, like 
‘no’ or ‘stop’. While we have not completely prevented participants from using these communication 
conventions, such usages are rare in our data. 
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Turn fire four burner fire 
Turn wide-object    
Cook insert    
Table 2b. Sample of utterances for ‘stove’ produced by signers of ABSL (Meir et al., 2010). 
Each row is an utterance. We label the utterances in table 2a as ‘gestures’ and the utterances in 
table 2b as ‘signs’ as ABSL has shown myriad forms of linguistic complexity that our 
participants’ gestures have not. 
Different quads conventionalize different systems, with some arbitrariness, in a self-
organizing manner 
 Figure 2 (blue curve) shows how the mean Jaccard index increased over time (as 
measured by “number of pairings so far”, see Table 1). We wanted to assess the extent to which 
this increasing jaccard index represented conventionalization, as opposed to mere regularization. 
That is, an increasing jaccard index could, a priori, simply reflect all participants, regardless of 
quad, discovering the single, optimal solution to communicating in the task. In contrast, groups 
arriving at true conventions would require a degree of arbitrariness of the conventions (Rescorla, 
2015; Hockett, 1960). That is, different groups ought to arrive at different conventions. To assess 
this, we conducted two different analyses. In the first, a Monte Carlo simulation, we repeatedly 
randomly reassigned participants in our existing dataset to novel, shuffled quads, and 
recomputed the jaccard index for these shuffled quads. Figure 2 shows that these shuffled quads 
conventionalized much less than the real quads, and that shuffled quads did not conventionalize 
in any appreciable way, suggesting that members of a quad are converging with each other, 
rather than with the participants of the entire experiment. Nor are quads inevitably and 
“independently” arriving at an identical, optimal solution. The second analysis is displayed in 
figure 3. Here, we computed pairwise Jaccard indexes for both within-quad communication 
partners (right panel of figure 3), and between-quad communication partners (left panel of figure 
3). As in the first analysis, the within-quad jaccard indexes are much higher than the between-
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quad jaccard indexes, the former reaching an average of .75 and the latter reaching an average of 
.25 by the end of the experiment. Finally, according to Lewis (1969), for a regularity R to be 
considered ‘arbitrary’, there must be some plausible alternative regularity R` that could serve R’s 
function. The English word ‘cat’ thus constitutes a convention, because there is the plausible 
alternative ‘gato’. We suggest that, here, for R` to be considered a plausible alternative that could 
serve R’s function, a gestural system R` should accomplish the task of communication 
comparably well to R. We already demonstrated that different quads attain different systems R, 
R`, etc.; but this does not demonstrate that these different systems suit the task of communication 
equally well. Figure 4, however, shows that they do. Figure 4 shows that error in the task 
declines over time and varies little across the quads. Thus, we argue that the different gestural 
systems that our quads converge on are properly arbitrary. 
Finally, the emergence of language, of which conventionalization is a part, is often 
thought to be a self-organizing process (Barr, 2004; Gong et al., 2012; Richie et al., 2014; 
Sandler et al. 2011). Self-organization is a term that has been used to describe a very wide range 
of phenomena. In computer science and artificial life, self-organization arises in cellular 
automata like Conway’s Game of Life, where simple beings die or spring to life based on their 
neighbors death/life, creating complex structures above the level of individual organisms 
(Gardner, 1970). In agent-based modeling (the kind of modeling often applied to language 
emergence, and which we will carry out in the present work), the term is used to describe 
systems of interacting agents that exhibit systematic behaviors. For example, Reynolds 
(1987) showed that “coordinated” flocking behavior emerges (“self-organizes”) among agents 
following very simple rules (e.g., maintain a certain distance from neighbors and maintain a 
similar heading). Kukona, Cho, Magnuson, and Tabor (2014), provide a definition of self-
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organization that will suffice for us: 
Self-organization refers to situations in which many, small, autonomously acting but 
continuously interacting elements exhibit, via convergence under feedback, organized 
structure at the scale of the group. 
 
Such a definition could, in principle, apply to our current experiment: individual, autonomous 
interlocutors interact with one another, and through feedback, converge on conventions shared 
across the whole group. However, it is worth more stringently probing the activity of our 
participants for evidence of self-organization. In the present data, self-organization would mean 
that no single member(s) of the language community lead or dominate, and instead, members 
create co-equally8. This self-organizing account contrasts most starkly with the dictatorial or 
‘institutional’ account described in the introduction, where single actors – whether individuals or 
institutions – dictate the convention to be followed. To assess, to a first approximation, whether 
self-organization reasonably characterized the quads in our study, we computed how much each 
participant changed their utterances – whether reducing or adding gestures – for a given item 
from interaction to interaction. If conventionalization were self-organizing in the specific sense 
defined above, then we would expect different participants within a quad to change their 
utterances to a similar degree. Figure 5 shows that, for each quad, this is indeed the case. Each of 
the 32 participants, represented by a different curve in a different subplot, changes roughly as 
much as their quad-mates, suggesting that no one participant within a quad controls the evolution 
of the quad’s system. If quads evolved in a dictatorial fashion, on the other hand, then each quad 
would have one participant who changed little over time, represented by a curve close to y=0. 
                                                        
8 At least, members within a generational cohort create more or less co-equally. Different generational 
cohorts seem to have different effects on language emergence (e.g., Senghas & Coppola, 2001). 
  27 
 
Figure 2. On the x-axis is time, as measured by pairings in the quad so far. On the y-axis is mean 
jaccard index, the measure of conventionalization. The blue curve represents the jaccard index 
within real quads. The green curve represents the jaccard index within shuffled quads. Real 
quads converged on shared systems substantially, while simulated quads do not. This finding, 
coupled with the finding that different quads perform roughly equally at the task, suggests that 
quads are creating proper conventions, in the sense that quads choose different but equally 
effective alternative systems. 
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Figure 3. This plot demonstrates that quads attain idiosyncratic, quad-specific agreement. Each 
quad is represented by a single line. The pairwise jaccard index is similar to the 4-way jaccard 
index used elsewhere, but is a more liberal measure of conventionalization, allowing for merely 
local conventionalization. The plot on the right demonstrates robust within-quad 
conventionalization, and was generated as follows: at each time point and item, we computed the 
average jaccard index between all possible pairs of within-quad productions (4 choose 2 = 6 
pairs of productions for each combination of quad, item, and time). The plot on the left 
demonstrates the low between-group conventionalization, and was generated as follows: Each 
curve represents a comparison between one group and a different group (there are 28 such 
possible comparisons). For each time point and item, we computed the average jaccard index 
between all possible between-group pairs of productions, i.e., between F01-A and F02-A, F01-A 
and F02-B, and so forth. Color represents different between-quad (left-panel) or within-quad 
(right-panel) comparisons, but we omit a legend indicating the mapping from color to 
comparison for space concerns, and because the different comparisons are not semantically 
meaningful as, say, item or time point would be. Within-group conventionalization is higher 
even at t=0 because each participant produces half of the utterances at t=0 after having seen their 
partner’s production for the same item. So, t=0 already enables some quad-specific 
conventionalization. 
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Figure 4. X-axis is time. On the y-axis is the rate of error. Error decreases across the experiment 
fairly consistently, and fairly comparably across quads, providing evidence that all quads reached 
equally optimal systems. 
 
 
Figure 5. Each subplot represents a single quad. Each hue represents a different member of a 
quad. On the x-axis is time. On the y-axis is the magnitude of the difference between consecutive 
utterances for the same object within a given individual. For example, if a participant produced 
{HORNS, MILKING} and then {HORNS, MOO} for ‘cow’, the magnitude of their change 
would be 2 (1 reduction plus 1 addition). It is not important to distinguish different hued lines. In 
fact, that participants’ lines mostly overlap suggests that the degree of change is similar across 
individuals within a quad, suggesting that no one participant in a quad dictates the process. 
  30 
Rather, participants co-create, or self-organize. 
 
Figure 6. On the x-axis is time. In green is the mean jaccard index, and in blue is the mean 
utterance length, as measured by the number of gestures in an utterance. Conventionalization and 
reduction are correlated: while quads conventionalize, they reduce. 
Conventionalization and reduction are correlated 
 The previous section demonstrated conventionalization in our experiment. We now turn 
to showing that reduction accompanies conventionalization in our experiment. Figure 6 shows 
conventionalization and reduction over time, averaged across all quads and items (and 
participants, in the case of reduction); as quads conventionalized, they also reduced. We also 
investigated this correlation across items (see figure 7). For each item, we conducted ordinary 
least squares regressions predicting jaccard index from time (pairings in the quad so far), and 
utterance length from time. We then extracted these slopes, and conducted a Pearson’s 
correlation between jaccard slopes and utterance length slopes. Jaccard slope was negatively 
correlated with utterance length slope, such that those items that conventionalized more 
drastically (increased jaccard index) also reduced more drastically (decreased utterance length), 
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r(23) = -0.57, p = .003. See Figure 8 for a scatterplot of jaccard slopes against utterance length 
slopes. 
 
 
Figure 7. Conventionalization vs. reduction for each stimulus item. In each subplot, the x-axis represents 
time (# of prior interactions) in the experiment. The blue curves represent degree of reduction (measured 
by response length, the number of discrete gestures in a response), while the green curves represent 
degree of conventionalization (measured by Jaccard Index). It somewhat appears that the items that 
conventionalize more (increase most in Jaccard Index) are also those that reduce more (in response 
length). See text and figure 8 for following up on this possible relationship. 
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Figure 8. Slopes of jaccards and (log) response lengths, and a linear regression line. Those items that 
conventionalize more (higher Jaccard slope), also reduce more (more negative response length slope). 
 
Analyzing the relationship between reduction and communication success 
 Recall that under various forms of listener-oriented, audience design or communicative 
accounts of reduction (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Buz, Tanenhaus, & Jaeger, 2016; Jaeger & Buz, 
2016; i.a.), a language producer is expected to reduce an utterance for a particular message 
following successful communication of that message (or, conversely, enhance a signal following 
failed communication). Thus, a plausible account of the relationship between conventionalization 
and reduction is that conventionalization causes communication success, which in turn causes 
reduction. In this section, we report an analysis testing whether participants do in fact reduce 
utterances for a given object after successful communication on the previous trial the object was 
described. 
We investigated this question with two analyses. We first conducted a mixed logit model 
(Jaeger, 2008) predicting whether a participant’s utterance for a given object is reduced or not, 
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depending on the success or failure of the participant’s previous utterance for that object. 
Previous success/failure was thus our single fixed effect. We also accounted for several random 
effects: item, quad, standardized time (i.e., centering and scaling our network-wide prior 
interactions variable), gesturer, comprehender, quad*gesturer interaction, and the 
quad*comprehender interaction), maximizing the random effect structure justified by the data 
(i.e., including random effects for slopes and intercepts; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily, 2013). 
Contrary to predictions, we found that reduction was correlated with previous failure, b = -0.743, 
p = 1.97 * 10-5. This effect was robust to different specifications of fixed and random effects 
structure (e.g., including time, gesturer, and comprehender as fixed effects). Our second analysis 
revealed the same finding: we extracted odds-ratios (of the odds of reduction following failure 
relative to the odds of reduction following success) for the different quads, different items, and 
different participants, and asked if the number of odds-ratios reflecting greater rates of reduction 
following success compared to failure were greater than could be expected due to chance. 
Indeed, all 8 of 8 quads had greater odds of reducing following failure (p=.008), as did 21 of 25 
items (p=.0009), and 27 out of 32 participants (p=.0001). 
These two analyses suggest the following: participants did not reduce at higher rates 
more after communication success as would be expected under certain listener-oriented accounts, 
but rather did the opposite, reducing at higher rates after communication failure. This unexpected 
finding thus suggests developing a different theory of conventionalization and reduction, 
implemented in a computational model. 
Chapter 4 - Computational Modeling 
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 We now turn our attention to modeling the phenomena of conventionalization and 
reduction, particularly as they manifest in the experiment just described. We proceed by (1) 
highlighting phenomena (again, particularly features of the experimental setup and results) that 
we attempt to model, (2) describing a previous model of conventionalization (Richie et al., 2014) 
and how it does not model these phenomena, (3) describing how we modify that model to 
capture (1), and (4) reporting behavior of this model. 
 To foreshadow the results of this section, our model demonstrates that 
conventionalization, reduction, and communication success – and particularly the relationships 
among them -- can be explained by assuming iconicity in the gestural modality, and simple 
probabilistic mechanisms of communication and learning. Further, the correlation observed in 
the lab and in the wild between conventionalization and reduction requires no links of speaker-
oriented or listener-oriented varieties. Rather, both conventionalization and reduction can result 
from agents (human or simulated) limiting their associations between gestures and objects to a 
mutually agreed upon narrower subset of gestures for a given object. This narrowing makes 
agents more certain of what to say when attempting to communicate an object, which translates 
into more concise expressions. 
Key aspects of the experiment to be modeled 
 Several desiderata for a model emerge from our experiment. We describe these now: 
1. Participants produce iconic gestures. Further, certain gestures only appeared with certain 
objects. For example, MILKING appears with ‘cow’ and ‘goat’, but not ‘truck’. Since 
participants come to the task with similar experience and conceptual representations for each 
object, they use similar iconic gestures, at least initially, and objects already differ 
substantially in the iconic gestures associated with them. 
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2. The comprehender in an interaction must choose an object from among a set of possible 
objects given the producer’s utterance. For communication to regularly succeed, this will 
require that participants use different gestures for different objects. 
3. In the experiment, producer and comprehender receive no explicit, reliable information 
about communication success or failure (this fact does not jeopardize communication and 
learning because of the iconic gestures – somewhat unique to each object – described 
above).9 
4. After participants within a quad interact, different quads conventionalize different systems 
for the same objects (see figures 2 and 3). 
5. Participants simultaneously conventionalize referring expressions, reduce those expressions, 
and increase their success at the task (figures 4 and 6 and section Conventionalization and 
reduction are correlated). 
6. As in naturalistic communication, there seems to be a link between communication success 
and conventionalization. That is, to be understood, interlocutors must share a communication 
system to some extent. However, in our experiment, we found that while 
conventionalization as measured by the jaccard index was initially quite low (blue curve 
in figure 2), communication success was nevertheless quite high (figure 4). (This high 
initial success despite low conventions is enabled by the iconicity referred to above.) 
                                                        
9 Interlocutors were anecdotally observed to sometimes signal uncertainty with facial expressions, 
hesitance in gesturing or picking a target, and so forth. However, we left uncertainty signaling out as a 
feature to be modeled, because (1) it was not a feature of interest to the original coding scheme for 
conventionalization, and (2) it is unclear how much effect it could have on participants development of 
gestural systems. Future work, however, could recode our video data for such signals of uncertainty, to 
assess the extent of their impact. 
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7. Finally, contrary to predictions of audience design/listener-oriented/communication ease 
theories, participants in our experiment reduced more often after communication failure 
than after communication success. 
We will refer back to these desiderata when describing our new model, and the behavior it 
produces. We will show that the model satisfies all seven desiderata. 
A previous model of conventionalization of referring expressions in an emerging 
signed system 
In the introduction we referred to a model of conventionalization of gestural referring 
expressions, devised by Richie, Yang, and Coppola (2014). This model was built with the aim of 
understanding effects of social network structure on conventionalization in cases of naturalistic 
gestural/signed language emergence (which was also the question of primary concern in Hall et 
al., 2016, which generated the experimental data for the present dissertation), cases which, as 
discussed earlier, bear striking resemblance to the present empirical data. Thus, this model 
provides a reasonable starting point for the present modeling aims. The architecture of the model 
is quite simple. An agent’s lexicon is just a matrix of probabilities for producing particular 
gestures (the columns in the matrix) for particular concepts/objects (the rows), with each 
probability randomly initially set (i.e., before agents interact) between 0 and 1. Uttering a string 
for an object is merely sampling the probabilities of gestures for that object. For example, if an 
agent’s vector of probabilities for an object is [.9, .9, .1, .9], they will likely produce a string of 
[1, 1, 0, 1], meaning the first, second, and fourth gestures are present. A listener likewise samples 
their probabilities for that object, and communication succeeds with a probability depending on 
how different (by Hamming distance) the speaker and listener utterances were (an ‘analysis by 
synthesis’ approach). If communication succeeds, the listener rewards or punishes their 
probabilities for the gestures associated with that object such that they are more likely to produce 
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strings like those the speaker produced. More specifically, they reward probabilities for present 
gestures and punish probabilities for absent gestures according to a reinforcement learning 
scheme (Bush & Mosteller, 1951). Over time, agents interacting in this way come to possess 
shared lexicons where they are likely to produce similar strings for the same objects. 
The Richie et al. (2014) model does not account for several features described in Key 
aspects of the experiment to be modeled. First, because the model independently and identically 
distributed each gesture-object probability between 0 and 1, there was no modeling of the 
iconicity space described in the first paragraph of Key aspects. Initial distributions for an object 
were overwhelmingly likely to overlap considerably with distributions for other objects. Second, 
the Richie et al. model stipulated that comprehenders already knew the producer’s intended 
object (for example, this would be the case if the producer pointed to the intended object in the 
scene). Thus comprehenders were not required to infer the target object, as they were in the 
experiment and presumably in (many or most) natural settings. Third, communication success 
depends entirely on conventionalization in the Richie et al. model, while these two factors 
dissociate somewhat in the current experiment. Finally, and most importantly, there was no 
tendency toward reduction in the Richie et al. model: agents were equally likely to 
conventionalize on a probability vector of [1,1,1,1], which would reliably produce utterances 4 
gestures long, as they were to conventionalize on a vector of [1,0,0,0], which would produce 
utterances 1 gesture long.10 
  
 Richie et al. (2014) The present model 
Initial lexicon Each gesture is an Overlapping distributions 
                                                        
10 In fact, agents could conventionalize a vector of all 0 probabilities, which would produce empty 
utterances. This outcome is less and less likely the more gesture slots agents must conventionalize over 
(i.e., the more columns in the lexicon matrix). 
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independently, identically 
distributed probability 
representing semantically 
related objects 
Speaking For the target object, sample 
each gesture’s probability 
Sample target object’s 
distribution for gestures until 
target recognized 
Listening Analysis by synthesis Infer target 
Update Reinforcement learning: reward 
present gestures, punish absent 
ones 
Move guessed object’s 
distribution toward 
utterance’s distribution 
Table 3. A comparison between the architectures of Richie et al. (2014) and the present model. 
A new model of conventionalization and reduction 
 To address these mismatches with the considerations raised in Key aspects, we devise a 
new model that bears some resemblances to Richie et al. (2014; see table 3 for comparison 
between the Richie et al. model and the present model). Most importantly, agents’ lexicons are 
still probabilistic mappings from objects to gestures. However, in the new model, agents’ vectors 
of probabilities for a given object are now probability distributions. That is, while in the original 
model a vector like [.9, .9, .1, .9] was possible, now the individual probabilities must sum to 1, so 
an allowable vector would be something like [.33, .33, .01, .33]. As will be explained soon, this 
change enabled modeling of reduction. To model the iconicity phenomena described so far 
(desideratum 1), agents’ lexicons start with uniform probability distributions over identical 
subsets of the gestures, with different objects’ subsets overlapping to a parameterized degree. 
Table 4a illustrates this setup. 
 Further, a speaking agent now produces an utterance by sampling their distribution (with 
replacement) for the target object until they recognize (guess) the target object from their own 
utterance. This speaking process can be understood as the agent communicating about the object 
until the utterance clearly specifies the object to them. The listener then guesses the target object 
using the same comprehension process (desideratum 2). Finally, listeners, simply assuming they 
guessed the target correctly, adjust their probability distribution for the guessed object by 
aligning it with the distribution of gestures in the utterance. At no point do speaker or listener 
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exchange information about each other’s success or failure, or the actual intended target 
(desideratum 3). In more detail, the process works as follows:  
1. The speaker samples a gesture from their distribution for the target object, with 
replacement. This utterance constitutes a distribution over gestures. 
2. For every object distribution x in the speaker’s lexicon: 
a. Compute Kullback-Leibler Divergence between the utterance distribution and the 
object distribution x. KL-Divergence for discrete distributions is defined as: 
 
Where i is an index for every outcome (here, gesture). 
 
b. Squash the KL-Divergence to the interval [0,1] via: 
 
 
 
c. Convert the squashed KL-Divergence to a similarity score between 0 and 1 via: 
 
1 – squashed_kl_divergence(speaker_string, object_probs) 
 
3. Normalize the set of utterance-internal_object similarities to a probability distribution 
over objects by dividing every similarity by the sum of the similarities: 
 
Distribution over objects = similarities / sum(similarities) 
 
4. To guess an object, sample the distribution once. 
5. If the target has been guessed, the utterance is finished. Otherwise go to step 1, and 
sample and add another gesture to the utterance. (In other words, the speaker repeats 
steps 1 through 5 until the speaker guesses the target.)  
6. The listener now guesses the target using their own lexicon, and steps 2-4 (i.e., they only 
guess the target once). 
7. The listener updates their distribution for the guessed object m as follows: 
a. Let Y = the utterance’s vector of probabilities for each gesture 
b. Let Z = the listener’s vector of probabilities for object m 
c. delta = learning_rate * (Y – Z) 
d. Z` = Z + delta 
e. Renormalize the new probabilities Z` so they sum to 1: 
i. Z` = Z` / sum(Z`) 
 
See the next page for a simple example of this process in action.  
1
1+ e-kl _divergence(speaker _ string,object _ probs)
*2+1
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 cow goat   cow goat 
HORNS .33 .33  HORNS .35 .33 
MILKING .33 .33  MILKING .30 .33 
BEARD 0 .33  BEARD 0 .33 
DRINK .33 0  DRINK .35 0 
Table 5. On the left is the initial lexicon for both agents A and B. On the right is the updated lexicon agent B obtains after 
listening to agent A. The current target object is ‘cow’. 
1. Speaker samples ‘cow’ distribution, utters HORNS. Utterance is distribution [1, 0, 0, 0]. 
2. For every object distribution x in the speaker’s lexicon, compute the similarity between 
the utterance distribution, and the object distribution. 
a. ‘cow’ => 1 – squashed_kl_divergence([1, 0, 0, 0], [.33, .33, 0, .33]) = .67 
b. ‘goat’ => 1 – squashed_kl_divergence([1, 0, 0, 0], [.33, .33, .33, 0]) = .67 
3. Normalize the set of utterance-internal_object similarities to a probability distribution 
over objects by dividing every similarity by the sum of the similarities: 
a. ‘cow’ => .67 / (.67 + .67) = .5 
b. ‘goat’ => .67 / (.67 + .67) = .5 
4. To guess an object, sample the distribution once. 
5. If the target has been guessed, the utterance is finished. Otherwise go to step 1, and 
sample and add another gesture to the utterance. 
a. For the purposes of illustration, suppose the speaker incorrectly guesses 
‘goat’. The speaker now continues uttering gestures. 
b. Speaker samples ‘cow’ distribution, utters DRINK. Utterance is distribution [.5, 
0, 0, .5]. 
c. Recomputing steps 2 & 3 yields new probabilities for the objects: ‘cow’=1, 
‘goat’=0. The speaker correctly guesses ‘cow’ and stops uttering gestures. 
6. The listener now guesses the target using their own lexicon, and steps 2-4 (i.e., they only 
guess the target once). 
a. Because the listener has the same lexicon as the speaker, they also correctly 
guess ‘cow’ in this instance with probability 1. 
7. The listener updates their distribution for ‘cow’ as follows: 
a. Let Y = the utterance’s vector of probabilities for each gesture 
i. Y = [.5, 0, 0, .5] 
b. Let Z = the listener’s vector of probabilities for object m 
i. Z = [.33, .33, 0, .33] 
c. delta = learning_rate * (Y – Z) 
         = .1 * ([.5, 0, 0, .5] – [.33, .33, 0, .33]) = [.017, -.033, 0, .017] 
d. Let Z` = new vector of probabilities for object m  
e. Z` = Z + delta 
     = [.33, .33, 0, .33] + [.017, -.033, 0, .017] = [.347, .297, 0, .347] 
f. Renormalize the new probabilities Z` so they sum to 1: 
i. Z` = Z` / sum(Z`) 
     = [.347, .297, 0, .347] / sum([.347, .297, 0, .347]) = [.35, .30, 0, .35] 
g. The listener’s new distribution for ‘cow’ is [.35, .30, 0, .35].  
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These speaking and listening processes can work – i.e., listeners rarely guess wrong – 
even when there is overlap in objects’ gesture distributions (as in table 1) because internal object 
distributions with no probability over an uttered CC have a squashed kl-div of 1, making their 
similarity and thus probability of being guessed 0. To illustrate, consider the initial lexicon in 
table 4a. If a speaker attempted to communicate the 1st object and ended up producing an 
utterance containing the 2nd and 5th gestures, a listener with the same lexicon and using the 
process described here would guess the 1st object with probability 1 and all other objects with 
probability 0, because even the neighboring objects (2 and 7) have no probability associated 
with one of the uttered gestures. Communication can only fail when a speaker produces a string 
in which more than one object has nonzero probability for all the uttered gestures. For this 
lexicon, that could only happen if a speaker produced an utterance with just gestures 1 and/or 2, 
or gestures 5 and/or 6. 
Finally, while agents in the Richie et al. (2014) model were paired into interactions 
randomly (modulo their social network structure), agents in the present simulations were paired 
up and interacted in the same schedule as in the experiment (see table 1; the basic pattern is: 
agents A and B interact, then C and D, then AC, BD, AD, BC, repeat from start), with the 
modification that the schedule of interactions repeated until some preset number of interactions 
had occurred. Further, whereas agents in the experiment discussed objects in a random order, 
agents in the model took turns describing and comprehending the objects in numerical order. For 
example, agent A would describe and agent B would attempt to comprehend object 1, and then 
they would switch roles. Then, agent A would describe and agent B would attempt to 
comprehend object 2, and then they would switch roles. This process would continue for the rest 
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of the objects, after which the next pair of agents in the interaction schedule would converse in 
the same turn-taking order. 
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Table 4a. An illustration of an initial lexicon of seven objects, each associated with only 6 of 28 possible gestures. Each cell indicates the probability of 
producing a particular gesture when describing an object. Each object overlaps with two gestures of each of its neighboring objects (see highlighted cells). A kind 
of semantic space is thus defined, with neighboring objects being semantically similar to the extent that they are associated with similar iconic gestures. Notice 
that probabilities wrap around the space, as illustrated by object 7. 
  Gestures / Conceptual Components 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
O
b
j
e
c
t
s 
1 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 0 0 
7 .16 .16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .16 .16 .16 .16 
Table 4b. An illustration of how the lexicon in Table 1 evolved in a single simulation lasting approximately 700 pairings. Each cell indicates the probability, 
written in scientific notation (1.09E-69 = 1.09 * 10-69), of producing a particular gesture when describing an object. Highlighted in orange are the probabilities 
that are over .1. Three objects are nearly uniquely associated with a single gesture: objects 1, 2 and 5. The remaining objects are still in the process of 
concentrating probability on a single gesture: owing to the positive feedback in the learning process, a lexicon split over multiple gestures is unstable. 
  Gestures / Conceptual Components 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
O
b
j
e
c
t
s 
1 
1.1
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15 
1.0
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06 
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0E
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0 
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2 0.0
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0.0
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+0
0 
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0 
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8.4
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0 
0.0
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0.0
0E
+0
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0.0
0E
+0
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0.0
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0.0
0E
+0
0 
0.0
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+0
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7.2
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11 
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01 
8.2
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0E
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0.0
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5E-
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1E-
01 
6.5
9E-
01 
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Model behavior 
 The parameter space for the model is sizable: there are parameters for the number of 
agents, objects, conceptual components/gestures, the overlap between neighboring objects, and 
the learning rate. As yet, we have only explored a small portion of this space. All simulations 
reported here use 4 agents, discussing 7 objects each initially associated with 6 gestures, two of 
which are unique to an object (as in table 4a), with a learning rate of .1. Future work with this 
model would of course need to explore the parameter space further, to understand, for example, 
how much the present findings of simultaneous conventionalization and reduction depend on the 
present parameter settings. 
 Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of jaccard index (the measure of conventionalization), 
communication success rate, and utterance length in a single simulation of the new model, and 
Figure 10 shows the same quantities averaged across 20 simulations. The figures illustrate two of 
the Key Aspects that the model captures: agents simultaneously conventionalize, reduce, and 
increase success at the task (desideratum 5), but despite low initial conventionalization, 
communication success starts quite high (desideratum 6). 
 Why do conventionalization, reduction, and increasing success (co-)occur in the way that 
they do? Conventionalization is initially low because probability is dispersed across several 
gestures for a given object, and agents will usually not randomly select the same gestures for the 
same object. At the same time, communication success starts relatively high because (1) speaker 
and listener share concentration of probability on a set of gestures unique to the target object, 
making it likely that the speaker’s utterance is closer to the target object in the listener’s lexicon 
than any other object, and (2) the speaker’s sample-until-recognition process implies that each 
generated utterance comes fairly close to approximating the (distinctive) distribution that 
generates it. Finally, utterance length is initially high in this model because speakers often need 
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to utter multiple gestures before they recognize/are confident in their utterance – their first 
gesture often overlaps with other objects, so the speaker doesn’t recognize the target object and 
must keep uttering gestures. For example, imagine a pair of agents interacts with the lexicon in 
table 3a, and the speaker attempts to communicate object 1. The speaker randomly produces 
gesture 2, doesn’t randomly guess object 1 (because they are equally likely to guess object 5), so 
then randomly utters gesture 1, but now happens to guess object 1 (even though object 5 is still 
possible). The listener then likewise attempts to guess the target, but they incorrectly guess 
object 5. Later, when the listener attempts to communicate object 1, they might produce many 
different combinations of gestures aside from {2,1}; the probability of these two agents (let alone 
all four agents) producing the exact same utterance for this object is low. 
Then, as agents interact, and as listeners move towards their speakers, the particular 
utterances speakers (probabilistically) produce are reinforced, making them even more likely to 
be produced in the future (a positive feedback effect). Because agents move towards one another, 
these reinforce utterances will be shared across agents, constituting conventions; further, 
different runs of the model produce different conventions, owing to the random sampling, 
mirroring the quad-specific conventions in the experiment (desideratum 4). The listener’s update 
procedure transfers probability from non-uttered gestures to uttered gestures, making the 
probability distributions less diffuse (lower entropy, in the information-theoretic sense). Because 
the probability distributions are less diffuse, and agents are unlikely to reinforce the same 
gestures for different objects (because the choice of which gestures to reinforce is random, and 
because the initial gestural overlap between objects is limited), different objects’ distributions 
overlap less, making comprehension – by the speaker or the listener – easier.  
  46 
To put this last point a little bit differently, evolved lexicons, in which objects’ 
distributions overlap less, mean speakers are less likely to produce ambiguous gestures. 
Ambiguous gestures are unlikely because putting probability on multiple objects for the same 
gesture is unstable. Suppose a gesture is associated with two objects with equal probability. 
When a listener is trying to infer the target object, the choice of object will be 50-50, but they 
will happen to choose one, and now the association between that gesture and that object will be 
reinforced. Now, the next time this gesture is produced, the listener will be slightly biased 
towards the object that they previously inferred. Hence, through positive feedback, the gesture’s 
association for one object will increase, while the association with the other object will decrease 
(because other gestures will be rewarded for that object). Finally, because the speaker 
comprehends their own utterances more easily, they tend to produce shorter utterances. 
Table 4b illustrates a lexicon having completed the process just described. (It is a single 
agent’s lexicon, but the other agents’ lexicons will be nearly identical, owing to the 
conventionalization process, so showing just this agent’s lexicon will suffice.) The main feature 
is that each object is now associated with one object, with probability rounding up to 1, and 
every other gesture with probability 0 or approaching 0.11 Further, different objects 
conventionalized different gestures. Now, when this agent wants to convey object 1, they are 
virtually guaranteed to select gesture 4 and understand their own utterance immediately, without 
having to utter additional gestures. Since their listener shares this lexicon, they are also virtually 
guaranteed to correctly guess object 1, and when it is their turn to convey object 1, they will also 
select gesture 4. Thus, short utterances and nearly perfect communication and 
conventionalization obtain at this point. 
                                                        
11 The fact that each row in the evolved table does not add up to 1 can be attributed to limits in how 
precisely floating point numbers can be represented. 
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 Finally, there is the question of whether this model reduces more often after failed 
communication events compared to successful events, as happened in the experimental data 
(desideratum 7). Subjecting simulation results to analyses similar to those in the experimental 
section, we do find evidence that the model reduces more often after failure. We simulated 20 
runs of the model using the same parameters as in figure 9, and for each run, counted the number 
of events of reduction and the number of events of nonreduction relative to the agent’s last 
utterance of that object. For each of those events, we also checked whether the agent’s last 
utterance of that object was a success or failure. We then computed each simulation’s odds of 
reducing following success, and odds of reducing following failure. We found that 18 of 20 
simulations showed greater odds of reducing following events of failure than events of success (p 
= .0004 by a binomial test); across simulations, on average 4.88% of events of success were 
followed by reducing, compared to 3.73% of events of failure. This relationship might be 
understood as follows: in the limit, communication success is (near) perfect, and utterances are 
one gesture long and cannot be reduced further. Thus, as successful events continue accruing 
without attendant reduction, the rate of reduction following successful events is low. This, in 
turn, guarantees that reduction is more likely after failure. 
A computer-aided function exploration suggests that this correlation between reduction 
and failure reflects a necessary, mathematical truth about the relation between two monotonic 
functions f(x), in any span of x (which here represents time). That is, reduction seems guaranteed 
to occur at a higher rate after failure than after success as long as the rate of reduction 
monotonically decreases and the rate of communication success monotonically increases over 
time (as we tentatively claim they do in the experiment and in the model, see figures 11 and 12). 
We tested this with reduction and communication trajectories of different functions as follows. 
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First, assume that the probabilities of reduction and communication failure both follow functions 
like e-x, the exponential decay function. At each time point x, we multiply the probability of 
reduction times the probability of communication success (or failure) to obtain the joint 
probability of an event of reduction, following an event of success (or failure). We sum these 
probabilities across all time points and then divide by the sum of the probabilities of success (or 
failure) at each time point, to yield the rates of reduction following success (or failure). We 
found that reduction occurred at greater rates following failure under several different functions 
of reduction and failure:  
 Rate of reduction and rate of failure both following e-x 
 Reduction following 2-x and failure following 3-x (i.e., communication failure 
decreasing faster than reduction) 
 Reduction following 3-x and failure following 2-x (i.e., reduction decreasing faster) 
 Reduction following .5 * 3-x and failure following .5 * 2-x (i.e., different exponential 
decay curves, with reduction decreasing faster than failure). 
To repeat, this analysis suggests that the reduction~failure correlation that we found 
follows from general mathematical properties and may not be particularly specific to our model 
or data. From this standpoint, correlation of reduction with failure is sensible, but it is also worth 
thinking back to how agents in the model behave under success and failure, and how this 
compares to listener-oriented theories of speaker and listener behavior. In listener-oriented 
theories, a speaker adjusts their productions based on the perceived success or failure of 
communication with the listener. In our model, however, agents do not reason about each other’s 
understanding at all – they, and only the listener at that, only modify their future behavior to 
better align their own utterances for each object with what they guess their interlocutor is talking 
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about. In that sense, our model embodies a theory rather different from listener-oriented theories 
of why language users reduce (the count of morphemes in) their utterances. 
 
Figure 9. Evolution of a single representative simulation of the model, where agents discuss 7 objects, 
and start with probability distributed across 6 gestures (conceptual components) for each object. Each 
object shares 2 gestures with its neighboring object, meaning that only 2 gestures are unique to a 
particular object; similarly, in the experiment, about 40% of the gestures ever used for an object were 
unique to that object. The learning rate gamma was set to .1. On the x-axis is number of network-wide 
interactions (the same measure of time used in the experiment), and the y-axis is shared between jaccard 
index (conventionalization), communication success, and response length. All three quantities co-evolve 
in a way similar to that of the experiment – conventionalization rises from near floor to (near) ceiling, 
communication success starts high but improves even further, also approaching ceiling. Utterances are 
initially more than 1 gesture long, on average, but shorten over time.  
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Figure 10. Averaged behavior of 20 simulations of the model, where agents discuss 7 objects, and start 
with probability distributed across 6 gestures (conceptual components) for each object. Each object shares 
2 gestures with its neighboring object, meaning that only 2 gestures are unique to a particular object. The 
learning rate gamma was set to .1. On the x-axis is number of network-wide prior interactions (the same 
measure of time used in the experiment), and the y-axis is shared between jaccard index 
(conventionalization), communication success, and response length. 
Conclusions of modeling 
To summarize the results of this section, our model demonstrates that 
conventionalization, reduction, and communication success – and particularly the relationships 
among them -- can be explained by positing iconicity in the gestural modality, and simple 
probabilistic mechanisms of gesture/language production, comprehension, and learning. Further, 
the correlation between conventionalization and reduction observed in the lab and in naturalistic 
settings requires no links of speaker-oriented or listener-oriented varieties. Rather, both 
conventionalization and reduction can result from agents (human or simulated) limiting their 
associations between gestures and objects to a narrower subset of gestures for a given object, via 
positive feedback of the gestures that are probabilistically produced for an object at early stages 
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of the group’s interactions. This narrowing makes agents more certain of what to say when 
attempting to communicate an object, which translates into more concise expressions, and makes 
the listener more certain of the target object’s identity. 
 
Figure 11. The rate of reduction in the experiment. The mathematical analysis described at the end of section Model 
Behavior was predicated on a monotonically decreasing rate of reduction. It is unclear whether the rate of reduction 
in the experiment meets this assumption – the rate is monotonic but for sharp increases at ~10 and 12 network-wide 
prior interactions. Given the large, largely overlapping error bars between 8, 10, and 12 interactions, however, this 
apparent departure from monotonicity may simply be noise. 
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Figure 12. The rate of reduction in a single run of the model. The mathematical analysis described at the end of 
section Model Behavior was predicated on a monotonically decreasing rate of reduction. Departures from 
monotonicity in this figure are due to noise. 
Chapter 5 - Discussion 
 
How do people invent communication systems? In naturally emerging languages, this 
process seems to involve both conventionalization – people creating shared systems of form-
meaning mappings – and reduction – linguistic forms being shortened over time (Osugi et al., 
1999; Meir et al., 2010; Richie et al., 2014). How do conventionalization and reduction (co-
)occur in language emergence and change? Previous theories of conventionalization, often 
embodied in computational models, have usually gone untested against empirical data. Further, 
while iconic forms have been observed to have an important role in language emergence (Meir et 
al., 2010; Richie et al., 2014), this role has not been formalized in any computational models of 
  53 
language emergence. Prior theories of reduction, on the other hand, have usually not been 
concerned with reduction in emerging languages, let alone signed languages, but rather in mature 
language change and short-term speaker choices. Finally, theories of the relationship between 
conventionalization and reduction have been vague and mostly concerned with reduction of 
phonetic substance rather than count of morphemes (or other discrete elements). 
This dissertation attempted to fill in these gaps, with an experiment requiring participants 
to negotiate a gestural communication system, and a computational model of conventionalization 
and reduction in that experimental setting. We found that, as in natural settings, participants in 
our experiment conventionalized and reduced communication systems simultaneously. Crucially, 
these systems were self-organized, and the ultimate systems possessed a degree of arbitrariness: 
different groups conventionalized different systems, each of which accomplished the task of 
communication comparably. Further, we found that participants did not reduce at higher rates 
after communication success, but rather after failure, a finding inconsistent with certain listener-
oriented theories of reduction (and the link between conventionalization and reduction). Then, in 
a computational model, we developed an alternative theory of conventionalization and reduction. 
In this model, agents (human or simulated) start with associations between objects and subsets of 
gestures iconically related to a given object. Then, via probabilistic gesture production and 
positive feedback for those gestures that happen to be uttered for an object, agents narrow their 
associations to smaller subsets of gestures for a particular object. This narrowing makes agents 
within a group more likely to produce the same gestures for a given object – this constitutes 
conventionalization. The narrowing of gesture subsets for a particular object also makes agents 
more certain of what to say when attempting to communicate an object. This greater certainty 
translates into more concise – that is, reduced – expressions, and also makes the listener more 
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certain of the target object’s identity, achieving greater communication success. In sum, the 
novelty of this theory is that conventionalization and reduction can be captured by probabilistic 
form-meaning mappings, language production dependent on a notion of informativeness 
(understanding one’s own utterance), and a single learning mechanism in listeners, whereby 
listeners align their probabilistic associations with speaker’s utterances. 
In the remainder of the discussion, we (1) relate these findings to existing theories of 
language emergence, conventionalization, and reduction, (2) discuss limitations of the present 
work, (3) describe future directions, and (4) summarize the findings and their implications. 
Relation to existing theories of language emergence, conventionalization and 
reduction 
 We first note how our model is consistent with past modeling frameworks of language 
emergence, and then discuss our model’s novelty. 
 As noted by Spike et al. (2016), the emergence of (human) communication systems has 
been observed in myriad experimental and naturalistic settings, and modeled in equally 
numerous ways, yet there is little consensus on the mechanisms driving the emergence of these 
communication systems. By far the strongest theoretical consensus seems to be that 
conventionalization of communication systems can be self-organized among agents lacking 
common knowledge (all agents are aware of a set of propositions, each agent knows that every 
other agent also knows those propositions, and so on recursively ad infinitum). Our model, like 
prior ones, also demonstrates this. Similarly, our model possesses the three qualities of 
successful models of language emergence that Spike et al. found in several families of such 
models. In the interest of continuing the theoretical integration begun by Spike et al., we now 
attempt to understand our model in terms of their three requirements for the emergence of 
conventional signaling: (1) creation and transmission of reference/referential information, (2) 
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anti-ambiguity bias, and (3) information loss. 
 Spike et al.’s (2016) first requirement is that speakers must have some way of 
propagating information about the intended referent to the listener. For example, in some models, 
speakers point at their intended referent (sometimes after failed communication) while in others 
the possible referents in a communicative act are only a subset of the wider universe of referents. 
Our experiment and model use neither of these approaches: listeners get no disambiguating 
information about intended referents, and the set of possible referents is the same on every trial. 
How do our participants and agents propagate referential information, then? They do so through 
iconicity: because participants and agents start with (nearly) equal iconic mappings between 
gestures and objects, the use of a particular gesture or set of gestures already provides a great 
deal of referential information to the listener. Thus, our model still satisfies Spike et al.’s first 
requirement, albeit in a possibly novel, unexpected way. In the next section we discuss this 
feature and its implications for generalizability of our work in greater depth. 
 Our model satisfies the second and third requirements in a more straightforward fashion. 
The second requirement is that there be some bias against ambiguity or homonymy – agents can 
not conventionalize the same form for every possible meaning, or else communication will not 
reliably succeed for different meanings. As discussed in the modeling section, the agents do 
typically conventionalize different forms for different meanings, because (a) agents are unlikely 
to randomly select the same gestures to reinforce into conventions for multiple objects, and (b) 
ambiguity is evolutionarily unstable: the positive feedback in the speaking-listening-learning 
loop ensures that, when one gesture has equal probability with two or more objects, probability 
will eventually concentrate on one object at the expense of others. To put this differently, the 
anti-ambiguity bias stems from the interaction of independently necessary agent components 
  56 
(speaking, listening, learning), and requires no additional agent cognition. Unlike models where 
agents have an explicit anti-ambiguity mechanism (i.e., periodically removing homonyms from 
the lexicon, or lateral inhibition among homonyms, e.g., Smith, 2002; Steels & Loetzsch, 2012), 
our anti-ambiguity bias is a side-effect of the independently necessary components of 
comprehension and learning. 
The third requirement is that there be some form of information loss, through, e.g., agents 
simply forgetting past form-meaning associations, or older agents being replaced by younger 
ones. Spike et al.’s (2016) intuitive explanation for this is that information loss reduces the 
impact of the early, disordered state of the communication system on the development of an 
optimal system. Our model essentially takes the forgetful agent approach: agents have no 
memory of their past interactions or lexicons that delivered them to their current lexicon; they 
remember only their current lexicon itself, which encodes minimal information about the agent’s 
history (because there are an infinite number of possible evolutions to any given lexicon). 
 The above discussion illustrates how our model is consistent with past theoretical 
development of language emergence. However, our model is novel in a number of respects. As 
mentioned in the introduction, Spike et al. (2016) point out that different empirical settings of 
communication could possibly engage different cognitive mechanisms for inventing 
communication systems. Despite this, as also mentioned in the introduction, integration of 
modeling and empirical investigation in language emergence is relatively rare. Our work here, 
however, is such an attempt at integration: our empirical setting constrained our model in a 
number of ways, including (1) the role of iconicity, (2) the lack of reliable, explicit 
communicative feedback, and (3) absence of evidence of a listener-oriented link between 
conventionalization and reduction. Future work could examine how changes to our setting 
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required – or not – appeal to different cognitive mechanisms for language creation. Our model is 
also novel in its accounting for conventionalization and reduction in language emergence. We 
now turn to relating our work to theories of reduction, and the relationship between 
conventionalization and reduction. 
First, our experimental finding that failure correlates with reduction is surprising given 
past findings that language users enhance their utterances following (perceived) failure to 
communicate (Buz, Tanenhaus, & Jaeger, 2016; Schertz, 2013; Stent, Huffman, & Brennan, 
2008). Two are at least two different possible reasons for this unexpected finding in our study. 
First, consecutive events of talking about a given object are minutes apart, and utterances about 
many other objects intervene. This may make it difficult for people to remember their perception 
of the success/failure of the previous attempt to communicate about a given object. Second, the 
signals of success/failure given by comprehenders might not be strong enough. Our experimental 
method prevented people from simply saying (in English) “I don’t understand”, nor could 
participants see their interlocutor’s choice of target, nor did experimenters give corrective 
feedback. Participants could only rely on gestures and facial expressions to signal their 
comprehension (see the following section on limitations of the present work for further 
discussion of this design choice). In other experiments where participants enhance following 
failure, however, incorrect target choices are explicitly signaled to the speaker (e.g., Buz et al., 
2016), and enhancement followed immediately after perceived errors as speakers attempted to 
repair communication in the same instance of communication (Stent et al., 2008). These design 
differences relative to previous work may account for our unexpected finding that reduction 
correlates with communication failure. 
The experimental and modeling findings that failure correlates with reduction isn’t 
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necessarily inconsistent with the listener-oriented theory – the correlation is perhaps just a 
necessary mathematical truth – but the model we develop here does still embody a theory of 
conventionalization and reduction that is somewhat different from prior listener-oriented, and 
possibly speaker-oriented, theories of reduction and the link between conventionalization and 
reduction. That is, our model is different from listener-oriented theories of language production 
and reduction in that agents do not reason about or even receive information about each other’s 
comprehension. Put differently, agents are not modulating their expressions based on the 
perceived comprehension of their interlocutors – listeners only adjust their future expressions 
based on their own comprehension of a speaker’s utterance. 
Whether our model is different from speaker-oriented theories is a bit less clear. Speaker-
oriented theories of reduction broadly hold that reduction results from language production 
becoming ‘easier’ (Jaeger & Buz, 2016). In our model, agents’ gradual concentration of 
probability on smaller subsets of gestures leads to speakers’ faster satisfaction with their own 
utterance. One could possibly construe this as agents having ‘an easier time’ producing language. 
This possibility of construing our model as a speaker-oriented/production ease account of 
reduction and its link to conventionalization is particularly intriguing given recent skepticism by 
reduction theorists (e.g., Jaeger & Buz, 2016) that production ease accounts could explain 
morphological reduction (other cases including, e.g., omission of the optional complementizer 
‘that’ as in “She knows (that) he’ll cook dinner”.). 
If the model can be construed as a speaker-oriented / production ease account, it is worth 
considering how this account compares to accounts of the link between conventionalization and 
phonetic reduction. As noted in the introduction, conventionalization is often accompanied by 
reduction of phonetic variables like vowel duration and signing articulatory space. To reiterate, 
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theorists typically explain this link as follows: conventionalization causes forms to be used 
repeatedly, which causes them to become automated or routinized, which causes them to be 
shortened (Bybee, 1999, 2006; Namboodiripad et al., 2016).12 This theory is actually slightly but 
importantly different from our model: in our model, conventionalization and reduction are 
caused simultaneously by a single learning mechanism, whereas in cases of phonetic reduction, 
conventionalization (purportedly) causes reduction. Thus, both phonetic reduction and the 
morphological reduction in our study could conceivably both be considered ‘speaker-oriented’, 
but their causal networks are somewhat different. Still, the possibility of a somewhat unified 
account of reduction phenomenon in emerging language conventionalization is interesting. 
 Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, part of the import of reduction phenomena is 
that they are often understood as making language systems ‘efficient’, by saying no more than 
necessary for communication success. However, as noted in other critiques of functionalist 
explanations of language structure and other behavior (e.g., Haspelmath, 1999; Scott-Phillips, 
Dickins, & West, 2011; Richie, 2016), to say that a language has a certain feature (here, short 
utterances for predictable information) because it is functional, requires showing that the 
language evolved that feature under pressures for that function. Our model, however, shows that 
a lexicon can evolve from longer expressions to shorter, more efficient expressions, even when 
there is no explicit optimization of any notion of ‘effort’. Indeed, agents in our model never even 
explicitly represent utterance length or any other effort-related quantities. The agents’ creation of 
efficient lexicons ‘falls out’ or emerges merely from speakers probabilistically producing 
                                                        
12 In the phonetic cases of reduction that Bybee (1999, 2006) and Namboodiripad et al. (2016) were 
concerned with (‘going to’  ‘gonna’), automation/routinization purportedly leads to greater 
coarticulation, overlap and ultimately elimination of segment boundaries and hence reduction in count 
and duration of segments. This could in principle lead to morpheme elimination of the kind that we were 
interested in here, but it would manifest as gradual rather than sudden disappearance of gestures. We have 
not conducted a phonetic-level coding of the data that would allow us to detect this, but we suspect 
gestures are eliminated without phonetic reduction precursors. 
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utterances until they recognize their target object, and then listeners updating their lexical entry 
towards that utterance. 
Limitations of the present work 
 Several considerations and caveats are necessary when generalizing the present findings. 
First, as with all experimental semiotics studies, the experimental setting is minute in scale and 
complexity compared to naturalistic language emergence – our participants only needed to 
communicate about 25 basic objects and didn’t have to describe events, and only interacted over 
a handful of hours, whereas natural language emergence unfolds over years and decades 
(Senghas et al., 2004; Sandler et al., 2011). That said, we believe that our participants were 
engaging similar cognitive mechanisms as those humans would use in natural language 
emergence settings. 
Another aspect of our experimental procedure perhaps lacking in ecological validity is 
the fact that participants did not receive explicit, reliable corrective feedback from experimenters 
and could not point to the referents of their utterances, as people do in naturalistic settings. That 
the experiment lacked experimenter feedback is perhaps not so bad – in the real world there is no 
omniscient third party guiding communication. But the impossibility of speakers using 
disambiguating deictics (before or after the listener attempted comprehension) does depart 
somewhat from natural settings. While sometimes people can’t point at the things they are 
talking about (for example, when their hands and body are occupied with other things), when 
they can point, they often do. A chef in a kitchen might point to an unusual ingredient while 
asking a novice busboy to get it. Similarly, a parent might point to an object while naming it for 
their child (and such ‘high-quality’ learning events are thought to be an important driver of child 
word learning; Cartmill, Armstrong, Gleitman, Goldin-Meadow, Medina, & Trueswell, 2013). 
The omission of both reliable corrective feedback and disambiguating deictics means that 
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participants have no way besides iconicity of understanding each other. In some ways, this 
makes our participants success even more striking, but as discussed, it makes our experiment less 
applicable to certain real-world settings. 
 There is a related concern regarding our analysis of the relationship between 
communication success and reduction. To repeat, the listener-oriented theory we tested holds that 
speakers reduce (or conversely, enhance) their utterances when their communication partner(s) 
indicate ease (or conversely, difficulty) with comprehension. However, we did not directly 
measure listeners’ ease/difficulty of comprehension, but rather made the assumption that 
successful or failed communication events were accompanied by listeners indicating 
(intentionally or not) their ease or difficulty to their interlocutors, and then related 
communication success/failure to future reduction. This assumption strikes us as reasonable, but 
clearly a more stringent approach would be to (a) code video data for listener signals of 
understanding/confusion, and (b) correlate such signals with future reduction/enhancement. This 
is one possible route for future work. 
Relatedly, the present experimental analyses are far from an exhaustive test of listener-
oriented theories. For example, such accounts of reduction often hold that linguistic forms that 
carry little information are those that are likely to be reduced or entirely eliminated (Piantadosi et 
al., 2011; Mahowald et al., 2012; Jaeger and Buz, 2016). Frequent forms are often those that are 
predictable, and thus can be eliminated. This possibility could surface in our experimental data as 
follows: the gestures that a participant eliminates for a given item at time n would be more 
frequent across items in previous productions, compared to the gestures that the participant 
produces at time n. One difficulty in implementing this analysis, however, lies in deciding what 
window of past productions to include for calculating gestures’ frequencies. Should the analysis 
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include all available productions, i.e., since the beginning of the experiment, or only those 
productions since the last time the participant produced the item in question? And should only 
the producer in question’s productions be considered, or should interlocutors’ as well? 
Interlocutors’ productions could conceivably contribute to a speaker’s estimates of form 
frequency. These are questions we leave to future work. 
Finally, there is the question of the extent to which our experiment and modeling can 
only generalize to systems in the same modality that we studied: gesture and sign. Gesture and 
sign afford considerable iconicity, and our experimental setup and computational model critically 
relied on this iconicity, as neither allowed for any other channel of transmission of referential 
information from speaker to listener (in the form of, e.g., disambiguating deictics or restricted 
sets of possible referents). As pointed out by Spike et al. (2016) and discussed in the previous 
section, transmission of referential information is critical for the emergence of conventional 
signaling systems, and iconicity served this purpose in our experiment and model. One might 
think that spoken languages do not contain comparable levels of iconicity that allowed a model 
like ours to work. 
There are a few responses to this concern. First, sign languages are natural languages as 
expressively powerful and structurally complex as spoken languages (Sandler and Lillo-Martin, 
2006), and used by tens of millions of people around the world (World Federation of the Deaf, 
2016), and are therefore objects worthy of study in their own right. That is, even if the present 
conclusions generalized only to sign languages, we believe that would still be a significant 
theoretical development. Second, spoken languages contain a degree of iconicity, too (for 
reviews, see Perniss, Thompson, & Vigliocco, 2010; Dingemanse, Blasi, Lupyan, Christiansen, 
& Monaghan, 2015). In addition to onomatopoeia (e.g. ‘bang’ for a gunshot, or ‘splash’ for an 
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object hitting water), there is the well-known ‘kiki’-‘bouba’ effect (people tend to think a sharp 
object is named `kiki` and a round object ‘bouba’). Further, the fact that iconic forms in sign 
language are often rendered arbitrary by historical change (Frishberg, 1975) might suggest that 
iconicity in emerging spoken languages has been obscured somewhat by language change. 
Though of course this is a theory that may be difficult to test with actual, emerging spoken 
languages, experiments suggest that emerging communication systems in the vocal channel can 
utilize iconicity (Perlman, Dale, & Lupyan, 2015). Thus, to the extent that (young) spoken 
languages are iconic like signed languages, there should be some generalizability from our 
findings to spoken languages. 
However, there are other caveats concerning the role and treatment of iconicity in the 
present work. For one, the model obviously oversimplifies iconicity: it is not the case that all 
objects one might want to talk about have a fixed amount of semantic overlap and non-overlap 
with other objects. Further, different people clearly have different semantic knowledge, and this 
can manifest in how their gestures iconically represent concepts. For example, in Japanese Sign 
Language ‘rock’ is signed with a throwing motion (purportedly because Japanese fisherman 
weight down their nets with rocks), while in American Sign Language ‘rock’ is signed by 
tapping the dominant hand onto the other hand (possibly representing the hardness of rocks). 
Similarly, children and adults differ in the extent to which they recognize and leverage iconicity 
in gestures, as perceiving iconicity is somewhat demanding of perceptual-conceptual mapping 
resources (Magid & Pyers, 2017). Of course, our experiment used adults who have an easier time 
encoding and decoding iconicity than children. To the extent that iconicity is necessary for 
bootstrapping a communication system, children’s limited ability to use iconicity may mean that 
they have less of a role in conventionalizing lexical items/referring expressions, whereas prior 
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work suggests they have a special role in shaping certain aspects of grammar (see Senghas & 
Coppola, 2001; Senghas, Kitz, & Ozyurek, 2004). Future work could (1) enrich the model’s 
iconic/semantic representations based on, for example, human-generated feature norms, and (2) 
investigate how inter-agent differences in initial semantic representations, and use of iconicity, 
influence language evolution. As discussed earlier, our models’ agents sharing an initial semantic 
space was critical for successful evolution of the system, so some amount of inter-agent 
consistency will be necessary for any language emergence operating as it does in our model, but 
the precise amount is currently unknown. 
Future directions 
In the introduction, we argued that conventionalization (and reduction) may be key to 
understanding the emergence of phonology and grammaticalization. We now reconsider these 
phenomena in relation to the present work. 
Regarding phonological combinatoriality, we must reiterate that the current experimental 
analyses and modeling did not investigate gestures at the phonetic level. That is, we did not code 
gestures for qualities like handshape, location, or movement (parameters key to sign language 
phonology; Sandler & Lillo-Martin, 2006). We only represented and modeled gestures in terms 
of their iconic meanings. In that sense, the present work by itself does not touch on the 
emergence of phonology. However, our participants very well might have invented phonological 
systems. That is, participants may have been conventionalizing not just particular gestures for 
particular objects, but also a limited inventory of handshapes, locations, movements and so forth 
with which to compose those gestures. How could such phonological categories be detected in 
systems such as the ones our participants created? In mature, stabilized languages, phonological 
categories are often determined by finding minimal pairs that differ only on particular segment or 
feature. For example, the existence of the words ‘pin’ and ‘bin’ in English is usually taken to 
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mean that /p/ and /b/ constitute separate phonological categories (phonemes). The same method 
is used in sign languages: the signs for ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are a miminal pair differing only on 
location (‘father’ is articulated at the forehead, and ‘mother’ at the chin). In principle, then, this 
same approach could be applied to gestural systems such as ours. However, the small number of 
meanings to be conveyed (25) relative to the number of possible articulatory configurations (i.e., 
combinations of handshapes, locations, movements, etc.) to convey these meanings makes it 
unlikely that two different gestures are adjacent to one another in this articulatory space (i.e., are 
minimal pairs). For this reason, the minimal pair method of determining phonological categories 
may be insufficient for the present experiment. 
Alternatively, phonological categories could possibly be assessed using motion-capture to 
yield fine-grained information about gestures in space. If participants are creating a limited 
inventory over the course of the experiment, then we should observe a gradual clustering of 
forms in gestural space. That is, initially, participants’ handshapes, locations, and movements 
should be relatively more uniformly distributed throughout the possible configurations of 
handshape, location, and movement. Over time, as participants selected a limited inventory of 
these, we should see multi-modal distributions, with modes corresponding to the prototype for 
each category of the limited inventory of articulatory features. 
However, even if a method of detecting emergence of phonological categories could be 
devised, the present experiment might not have sufficiently encouraged phonological 
development. For one, experimental evidence suggests that allowing iconic forms, as the present 
experiment did, inhibits the emergence of phonology (Roberts, Lewandowski, & Galantucci, 
2015). Second, the emergence of phonology is often argued to be a solution to the problem of 
lexical contrast posed by large lexicons (Hockett, 1960; Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005; Nowak & 
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Krakauer, 1999; Zuidema & de Boer, 2009; Wedel, 2012).13 Thus, to the extent that (a) the 
emergence of phonology is driven by large lexicons, and (b) the present experiment did not 
involve communicating a large number of meanings (25, cf. the tens of thousands of meanings 
typically encoded by lexicons of mature natural languages, Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005), 
participants in our experiment may not have been encouraged to develop phonology.  
Regardless of the degree of phonology in the present experimental data, simultaneously 
modeling conventionalization, reduction, and the emergence of phonology would seem to 
require a model of substantial complexity. Such a model would need to simultaneously represent 
iconicity, as we have done here, but also the phonetic qualities along which iconic gestures vary. 
It is unclear the precise form such a model would take, but it might be obtained from a synthesis 
of the present model with prior agent-based models of phoneme inventory evolution, which also 
involve populations of agents speaking, listening, and learning from one another (e.g., de Boer, 
2000; Wedel, 2012). 
The import of our work for grammaticalization is similar. Our participants only needed to 
convey objects and not events, so the gestures they produced tended to represent concrete 
meanings rather than the abstract meanings typically encoded by grammatical elements. That is, 
participants had no need to encode concepts like person (e.g., I vs you), tense (e.g., past vs 
present), aspect (e.g., ‘I run’ vs ‘I am running’), mood (e.g., possibility vs requirement), and 
relations which are often encoded (at least in English) with prepositions (‘in’), complementizers 
(‘because’), and relativizers (‘who’ as in ‘the man who sleeps’). Indeed participants only very 
rarely represented such concepts – anecdotally, the only potentially grammatical forms we 
                                                        
13 This argument takes various forms. On argument is that the problem of distinguishing large numbers of 
holistic word forms is avoided by concatenating such forms (i.e., ‘cat’ is a concatenation of /c/, /a/, and /t/. 
A different argument is that combinatorial phonology allows words to be ordered in a list like a phone 
book, which allows quicker lexical retrieval. Many such arguments are not mutually exclusive. 
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observed included gestures representing number (to indicate the number of objects on a card) or 
negation (as in, NOT-LARGE-ROUND, see table 2a) and points to oneself or to one’s 
interlocutor to indicate gender. To this extent, our experiment is unlikely to have produced 
grammaticalization phenomenon, and our model certainly was not designed to capture such.  
This is not to say that the present paradigm and model cannot be useful for contributing 
to understanding of grammaticalization. Our paradigm could be modified so that participants talk 
not about objects, but events, as in similar experimental semiotics work in the gestural modality 
(e.g., Carrigan, 2016). Comparing our data to such a new dataset, different from ours only in the 
things discussed (objects, vs events involving those objects), might be useful in gauging how 
describing events drives grammaticalization more than does merely describing objects. Modeling 
how conventionalization (and reduction) drive grammaticalization may present more of a 
challenge. For one, in contrast to the emergence of phonology, there are very few models of 
grammaticalization from which to draw inspiration. One of the few was devised by Tabor 
(1994). By training an artificial neural network on sentences generated by a probabilistic context-
free grammar, and then changing the probabilities of certain rules in the grammar and continuing 
to train the network, Tabor was able to model the reanalysis (a route of grammaticalization) of 
the phrase ‘be going to’ from an indicator of motion (as in “I am going to the store”) to a 
indicator of futurity (as in “I am going to buy milk”). Other models of grammaticalization are not 
computational models of psycholinguistic processes, but statistical models of lexical change in 
historical corpora (e.g., Sagi, Kaufmann, & Clark, 2011 on ‘do’ undergoing semantic 
broadening, a process often accompanying grammaticalization). Importantly, none of these is a 
model of interacting humans, attempting to communicate with one another. Thus, the way to 
integrate prior models of grammaticalization with the current dissertation’s model is not entirely 
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clear. One possibility, only vaguely specified at the moment, is that the agents in the present 
model could be replaced with artificial neural networks which not only conventionalize with 
other agents, but also reanalyze – that is, grammaticalize – their linguistic input much like the 
networks in Tabor (1994). One challenge for such models is to explain how, cross-linguistically, 
events of language use and learning grammaticalize forms for particular meanings, like motion 
or possession (as in English ‘I have goats’), into markers for particular grammatical functions, 
like futurity or perfective aspect (‘I have owned goats’; Dahl & Velupillai, 2013). 
Conclusion 
 
 The present dissertation investigated the emergence of communication systems – 
particularly, systems that conventionalize and reduce – among interacting adults and simulated 
agents. The experimental and modeling work both suggest a new understanding of the relation 
between conventionalization and reduction. Whereas existing theories of the link between 
conventionalization and reduction rely on either (1) vague notions of automaticity or (2) agents 
explicitly optimizing for communicative efficiency, our work suggests a different account: 
interacting language users evolve an iconic world-referent correspondence system into a system 
that is conventional and reduced (i.e., efficient) in a social context by adhering to informative 
utterances and emulating one another. While this view of communication systems as emergent 
results of self-organizing populations is common in language emergence theories, concrete 
specifications inspired by detailed empirical observations have been uncommon. We hope future 
work exploring the self-organization of language emergence will continue to integrate 
experiments, naturalistic observation, and computational modeling, as we have done here. Such 
an ecumenical approach will be fruitful in further exploring deeper issues in language 
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emergence, including phonological combinatoriality and grammaticalization.  
  70 
References 
 
Arnold, J. E., Kahn, J. M., & Pancani, G. C. (2012). Audience design affects acoustic reduction 
via production facilitation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(3), 505–512. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-012-0233-y 
Baronchelli, A., Gong, T., Puglisi, A., & Loreto, V. (2010). Modeling the emergence of 
universality in color naming patterns. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America, 107(6), 2403–7. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0908533107 
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure for 
confirmatory hypothesis testing : Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 
68(3), 255–278. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001 
Boer, B. De. (2000). Self-organization in vowel systems. Journal of Phonetics, 28(4), 441–465. 
Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095447000901256 
Brennan, S. E., & Hanna, J. E. (2009). Partner-specific adaptation in dialog. Topics in Cognitive 
Science, 1(2), 274{291. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01019.x 
Brentari, D. (2007). Sign language phonology: issues of iconicity and universality. In E. Pizzuto, 
P. Pietrandrea, and R. Simone (Eds), Verbal and Signed Languages, Comparing Structures, 
Constructs and Methodologies, pp. 59-80. 
Brentari, D. (2017) Sign Language Phonology. In G. Gertz and P. Boudrealt, (Eds.), The Deaf 
Studies Encyclopedia. Sage Publishers.  
Bush, R., & Mosteller, F. (1951). A mathematical model for simple learning. Psychological 
Review, 68, 313-323. 
  71 
Buz, E., Tanenhaus, M.K., & Jaeger, T.F. 2016. Dynamically adapted context-specific hyper-
articulation: Feedback from interlocutors affects speakers' subsequent pronunciations. 
Journal of Memory and Language. doi: 10.1016/j.jml.2015.12.009 
Bybee, J. (1999). Usage-based phonology. Functionalism and formalism in linguistics, 1, 211-
242. 
Bybee, J. (2003) Mechanisms of Change in Grammaticization: The Role of Frequency, in The 
Handbook of Historical Linguistics (eds B. D. Joseph and R. D. Janda), Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9780470756393.ch19 
Bybee, J. (2006). From usage to grammar: the mind's response to repetition. Language 82(4): 
711-733. 
Caldwell, C. A., & Smith, K. (2012). Cultural evolution and perpetuation of arbitrary 
communicative conventions in experimental microsocieties. PLoS ONE, 7(8). 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0043807 
Carrigan, E. (2016). An experimental investigation of the factors supporting the emergence of 
spatial agreement in Nicaraguan Sign Language. Unpublished doctoral dissertation: 
University of Connecticut. Retrieved from 
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/1299 
Cartmill, E. A., Armstrong, B. F., Gleitman, L. R., Goldin-Meadow, S., Medina, T. N., & 
Trueswell, J. C. (2013). Quality of early parent input predicts child vocabulary 3 years later. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(28), 1 1278–11283. doi: 
10.1073/pnas.1309518110 
  72 
Centola, D., & Baronchelli, A. (2015). The spontaneous emergence of conventions: An 
experimental study of cultural evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
112(7), 201418838. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1418838112 
Dahl, O., Velupillai, V. (2013). The Perfect. In M. S. Dryer, & M. Haspelmath (Eds.)  The World 
Atlas of Language Structures Online. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary 
Anthropology. (Available online at http://wals.info/chapter/68, Accessed on 2017-08-01.)  
Dingemanse, M., Blasi, D. E., Lupyan, G., Christiansen, M. H., & Monaghan, P. (2015). 
Systematicity in Language. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(10), 603–615. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.07.013 
Fowler, C. A., & Housum, J. (1987). Talkers’ signaling of “new” and “old” words in speech and 
listeners’ perception and use of the distinction. Journal of Memory and Language, 26(5), 
489–504. http://doi.org/10.1016/0749-596X(87)90136-7 
Frishberg, N. (1975). Arbitrariness and Iconicity : Historical Change in American Sign 
Language. Language, 51(3), 696–719. http://doi.org/10.2307/412894 
Galantucci, B. (2005). An experimental study of the emergence of human communication 
systems. Cognitive Science, 29(5), 737–767. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog0000_34 
Galantucci, B., Garrod, S., & Roberts, G. (2012). Experimental Semiotics. Language and 
Linguistics Compass, 6(8), 477–493. http://doi.org/10.1002/lnc3.351 
Galati, A., & Brennan, S. E. (2010). Attenuating information in spoken communication: For the 
speaker, or for the addressee? Journal of Memory and Language, 62(1), 35–51. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2009.09.002 
Gardner, M. (1970). Mathematical Games – The fantastic combinations of John Conway's new 
solitaire game "life". Scientific American, 223: 120–123. 
  73 
Gong, T., Baronchelli, A., Puglisi, A., Loreto, V. (2012). Exploring the Roles of Complex 
Networks in Linguistic Categorization. Artificial Life, 121, 107–121. 
Hall M., Richie R. and Coppola M. (2016). The impact of communicative etwork structure on 
the conventionalization of referring expressions in gesture. In S.G. Roberts, C. Cuskley, L. 
McCrohon, L. Barceló-Coblijn, O. Feher & T. Verhoef (Eds.) The Evolution of Language: 
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference (EVOLANG11). Available 
online:http://evolang.org/neworleans/papers/134.html 
Haspelmath, M. (1999). Optimality and diachronic adaptation. Zeitschrift Für 
Sprachwissenschaft, 18.2, 180-205. 
Heinz, J., & Idsardi, W. (2013). What Complexity Differences Reveal About Domains in 
Language. Topics in Cognitive Science, 5(1), 111–131. http://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12000 
Hockett, (1960) The Origin of Speech, Scientific American 203, 88–111 Reprinted in: Wang, 
William S-Y. (1982) Human Communication: Language and Its Psychobiological Bases, 
Scientific American pp. 4–12 
Jacobs, C. L., Yiu, L. K., Watson, D. G., & Dell, G. S. (2015). Why are repeated words produced 
with reduced durations? Evidence from inner speech and homophone production. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 84, 37–48. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2015.05.004 
Jaeger, T.F., & Buz, E. (2016.) Signal reduction and linguistic encoding. In E. M. Fernández & 
H. S. Cairns (Eds.), Handbook of Psycholinguistics. Wiley-Blackwell. 
Kahn, J. M., & Arnold, J. E. (2012). A processing-centered look at the contribution of givenness 
to durational reduction. Journal of Memory and Language, 67(3), 311–325. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2012.07.002 
  74 
Kirby, S., Cornish, H., & Smith, K. (2008). Cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory: an 
experimental approach to the origins of structure in human language. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105(31), 10681–6. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0707835105 
Sagi, E., Kaufmann, S., & Clark, B. (2011). Tracing semantic change with Latent Semantic 
Analysis. In Allen, Kathryn and Justyna Robinson (Eds.), Current Methods in Historical 
Semantics, pages 161-183. De Gruyter Mouton. 
Kocab, A., Pyers, J., & Senghas, A. (2014). Referential shift in Nicaraguan Sign Language: a 
transition from lexical to spatial devices. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1540. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01540 
Lam, T. Q., & Watson, D. G. (2014). Repetition reduction: Lexical repetition in the absence of 
referent repetition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 40(3), 829. 
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical 
data. Biometrics, 159-174. 
Lewis, David, 1969. Convention, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Magid, R. W., & Pyers, J. E. (2017). ‘I use it when I see it’: The role of development and 
experience in Deaf and hearing children ’ s understanding of iconic gesture.” Cognition, 
162, 73–86. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.015 
Mahowald, K., Fedorenko, E., Piantadosi, S. T., & Gibson, E. (2013). Info/information theory: 
Speakers choose shorter words in predictive contexts. Cognition, 126(2), 313–318. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.09.010 
  75 
Meir, I., Aronoff, M., Sandler, W. & Padden, C. (2010). Sign languages and compounding. In 
S.Scalise & I.Vogel (Eds.): Compounding. John Benjamins, 301-322. 
Morford, J. P., & Kegl, J. A. (2000). Gestural precursors to linguistic constructs: how input 
shapes the form of language. Language and gesture, 2, 358. 
Namboodiripad, S., Lenzen, D., Lepic, R., & Verhoef, T. (2016). Measuring conventionalization 
in the manual modality. Journal of Language Evolution, 1(2), 109–118. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/jole/lzw005 
Nowak, M., & Krakauer, D. (1999). The evolution of language. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 96(July), 8028–8033. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.14.8028 
Osugi, Y., Supalla, T., & Webb, R. (1999). The use of word elicitation to identify distinctive 
gestural systems on Amami Island. Sign language & linguistics, 2(1), 87–112. Retrieved 
from http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=1554456 
Pérez, A. (1990). Time in motion: Grammaticalization of the be going to construction in English. 
La Trobe University Working Papers in Linguistics 3, 49-64. 
Perlman M, Dale R, Lupyan G. (2015). Iconicity can ground the creation of vocal symbols. 
Royal Society Open Science, 2(8), 150152. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.150152 
Perniss, P., Thompson, R. L., & Vigliocco, G. (2010). Iconicity as a General Property of 
Language: Evidence from Spoken and Signed Languages. Frontiers in Psychology, 1, 227. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00227 
Piantadosi, S. T., Tily, H., & Gibson, E. (2011). Word lengths are optimized for efficient 
communication. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 108(9), 3526–9. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1012551108 
  76 
Pierrehumbert, J. B., Stonedahl, F., & Daland, R. (2014). A model of grassroots changes in 
linguistic systems, 30. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.1985 
Pinker, S. & R. Jackendoff. (2005). The faculty of language: What’s special about it? Cognition, 
95. 201–236. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object: An Inquiry into the Linguistic Mechanisms of 
Objective Reference. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Rescorla, M. (2015). Convention. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/convention/>. 
Reynolds, C.W. (1987) Flocks, herds, and schools: A distributed behavioral model. Computer 
Graphics, 21, 25–34. 
Richie, R. (2016). Functionalism in the lexicon: Where is it, and how did it get there? In G. 
Jarema, G. Libben, & V. Kuperman (Eds.), Thematic Issue of The Mental Lexicon: New 
Questions for the Next Decade, 11(3), 429–466. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi 
10.1075/ml.11.3.05ric. 
Richie, R., Yang, C., & Coppola, M. (2014). Modeling the emergence of lexicons in homesign 
systems. Topics in Cognitive Science, 6, 183-195. 
Roberts, G., Lewandowski, J., & Galantucci, B. (2015). How communication changes when we 
cannot mime the world: Experimental evidence for the effect of iconicity on 
combinatoriality. Cognition, 141, 52–66. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.001 
Roche, J. M., Dale, R., & Kreuz, R. J. (2010). The resolution of ambiguity during conversation: 
More than mere mimicry? In R. Camtrabone & S. Ohlsson (Eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd 
  77 
Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society  (pp. 206{211). Austin, TX: Cognitive 
Science Society. 
Sandler, W., Aronoff, M., Meir, I., & Padden, C. (2011). The gradual emergence of phonological 
form in a new Language. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 29(2), 503–543. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11049-011-9128-2 
Sandler, Wendy & Lillo-Martin, Diane (2006). Sign Language and Linguistic 
Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schober, M. F., & Clark, H. H. (1989). Understanding by addressees and overhearers. Cognitive 
psychology, 21(2), 211-232. 
Schertz, J. (2013). Exaggeration of featural contrasts in clarifications of misheard speech in 
English. Journal of Phonetics , 41(3-4), 249-263. doi: 10.1016/j.wocn.2013.03.007 
Scott-Phillips, T. C., Dickins, T. E., & West, S. A. (2011). Evolutionary theory and the ultimate–
proximate distinction in the human behavioral sciences. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 6(1), 38-47. 
Senghas, A., & Coppola, M. (2001). Children creating language: how Nicaraguan sign language 
acquired a spatial grammar. Psychological Science : A Journal of the American 
Psychological Society / APS, 12(4), 323–328. http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00359 
Senghas, A., Kita, S., Ozyürek, A. (2004). Children Creating Core Properties of Language: 
Evidence from an Emerging Sign Language in Nicaragua. Science, 305(5691), 1779–1782. 
http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1100199. 
Smith, K. (2002). The cultural evolution of communication in a population. Connection Science, 
14(1), 65–84. 
  78 
Steels, L., & Loetzsch, M. (2012). The grounded naming game. In L. Steels (Ed.), Experiments 
in cultural language evolution (pp. 41–59). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Stent, A. J., Hu_man, M. K., & Brennan, S. E. (2008). Adapting speaking after evidence of 
misrecognition: Local and global hyperarticulation. Speech Communication, 50  (3), 163-
178. doi: 10.1016/j.specom.2007.07.005 
Spike, M., Stadler, K., Kirby, S., & Smith, K. (2016). Minimal Requirements for the Emergence 
of Learned Signaling. Cognitive Science, 1–36. http://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12351 
Verhoef, T. (2012). The origins of duality of patterning in artificial whistled languages. 
Language and Cognition, 4, 357-380. 
Verhoef, T., Kirby, S. & de Boer, B. (2015). Iconicity and the emergence of combinatorial 
structure in language. Cognitive Science. doi:10.1111/cogs.12326 
Wedel, A. (2012). Lexical contrast maintenance and the organization of sublexical contrast 
systems. Language and Cognition, 4(4), 319–355. http://doi.org/10.1515/langcog-2012-
0018 
World Federation of the Deaf (2016). Sign Language - WFD. Retrieved from 
https://wfdeaf.org/human-rights/crpd/sign-language/ 
Zuidema, W., & Boer, B. De. (2009). The evolution of combinatorial phonology. Journal of 
Phonetics, 37, 125–144. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095447008000624 
  
  79 
Appendix A. Experimental items 
avocado 
baseball cap 
beans 
boy 
cabbage 
cloud 
cow 
cowboy hat 
dog 
girl 
goat 
horse 
lake 
lime 
man 
mountain 
old woman 
orange 
pig 
policeman 
rice 
sheep 
soldier 
truck 
woman 
